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 1 
Introduction 
 
Water is one of the most basic human needs but despite remarkable progress, access 
to clean and safely managed water is still one of the biggest challenges facing people 
in growing cities around the world. Access to water from improved sources has 
increased rapidly on a global scale in the 21st century. Between 2000 and 2015, the 
number of people with access to improved water sources has increased from 5,2 billion 
to 6,8 billion (WHO/UNICEF, 2017). Out of the 1,6 billion gaining access to improved 
sources, 1,2 billion gained access to piped water networks (WHO/UNICEF, 2017). In 
2015, an estimated 89 per cent of the global population had access to at least basic 
water services, defined as an improved water source that can be accessed within a 
roundtrip of 30 minutes.   
 
However, improved access to water is by no means equally distributed globally. While 
89 per cent of the global population has access to basic water services, this is only true 
for around 58 per cent of the population in sub-Saharan Africa (SSA), the worst 
performing region in the world regarding access to water (WHO/UNICEF, 2017). 
Although the overall access to basic water services has increased relatively fast in SSA 
(by 0,88 percentage points annually compared to the global average of 0,49 between 
2000 and 2015), the situation in cities remains problematic. Between 1990 and 2010, 
access to improved water services in urban areas remained unchanged, at 83 per cent 
for the region, while access to piped water in cities actually declined from 43 per cent 
to 34 per cent (Hopewell, 2014). It is also important to recognise that development in 
practice can differ from development in theory, and that statistics of increasing access 
to water do not always tell the whole truth of “deeper access”, i.e. the availability, 
reliability, quality and cost of water services (Obeng-Odoom, 2012). The stagnation 
of access to improved and basic water services in urban sub-Saharan Africa is likely 
to pose an even greater challenge in the future, with today’s urban population of 472 
million people expected to double in the next 25 years (Lall et al. 2017) reaching over 
1 billion people in 2050 (Dos Santos et al., 2017).  
 
The urban population that lacks access to improved water services generally get their 
water from either unprotected wells and springs or directly from surface water sources 
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(WHO/UNICEF, 2017). These practices, in combination with extracting water from 
boreholes and purchasing water from small-scale vendors, constitute the main water 
supply system in many poor urban areas in SSA (Olajuyigbe, 2012; Liddle et al., 2016) 
and can be referred to as the informal water sector. The concept of the informal water 
sector is an ideal type, since in empirical terms the formal and informal are typically 
intertwined, for example when informal water vendors re-sell water from the formal 
utility (Misra, 2014) or in the case of community-public partnerships (see section 
below). However, the concept of “the informal water sector” should be understood not 
only as informal water sources that exist outside the control of the state, but as practices 
produced and re-produced both by urban and peri-urban communities, the state itself 
and everything in between (Roy, 2011; Kooy, 2014). 
 
The informal water sector commonly holds no legal status, and the practices associated 
with it is sometimes even regarded as illegal (Liddle et al., 2016). Nevertheless, in 
most cities in the global south, the informal sector provides water for 30–60 per cent 
of the urban population (Ahlers et al., 2014). Unregulated informal practices within 
the water sector are not necessarily always indicators of risk. A protected informal 
source, like a deep well with inner casing and a protective cover situated far enough 
from contaminating sources, can provide a community with water of the same quality 
as a formal piped network, or even better. That said, in urban areas, a high reliance on 
informality is often associated with increased vulnerability both because of a high rate 
of uncovered water sources and higher risk of contamination. In urban areas, 
unprotected wells and springs, not to mention surface water, are easily exposed to 
contamination from sources like factories, dumping grounds or latrines, especially 
during floods when contaminated water easily can get mixed with the water in an 
unprotected well. The rapidly expanding city of Lagos in southern Nigeria, where the 
sewage network is close to non-existent and up to two-thirds of childhood disease can 
be attributed to a lack of safe drinking water (Gandy, 2006) is a daunting example of 
this vulnerability.  
 
The informal water sector has often been viewed by states, NGOs and international 
institutions as a temporary and somewhat problematic alternative to “the urban 
infrastructural ideal”: a centralised piped water network that provides everyone with 
improved access to water (Kooy, 2014; Allen et al., 2017). The informal water sector, 
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and the health problems associated with it, has been assumed to slowly fade away as 
soon as the formal piped water network is fully developed to provide water for 
everyone (Kooy, 2014; Mapunda et al., 2018). However, the development of piped 
water infrastructure has not kept up with urbanisation and is today far from providing 
safe access to water for the poorest in society. Even in places where the piped networks 
have been successfully expanded, there are evidence of local communities continuing 
to rely on the more trusted informal water sources (Kooy, 2014; Liddle et al., 2016) 
either because of the poor quality of the piped water or because of its bad reputation. 
This is not only true for the poorest groups in society, also high-income communities 
sometimes prefer informal water sources in places where formal sources are either 
unreliable or have a bad reputation (Liddle et al., 2016).    
 
The failure to achieve the “urban infrastructural ideal” (Kooy, 2014) of water on tap 
for everyone has sparked new ideas about the informal sector’s role as a water provider 
in developing cities. Despite the problems associated with the informal water sector, 
informally managed water provision systems are increasingly seen as a viable 
alternative to the standard solution of increasing water access in developing cities 
(Ahlers et al., 2014; Kooy, 2014; Liddle et al., 2016; Mapunda et al., 2018), that is, 
the formal piped water network, given that the water quality of the informal sector is 
improved. Many argue that, since the urban infrastructural ideal has failed, the state 
should accept and support the informal water sector as a pragmatic and cost-effective 
alternative for water supply in local communities (Kjellén, 2006; Allen et al., 2006; 
Chakava et al., 2014; Kooy, 2014; Liddle et al., 2016; Mapunda et al., 2018).  
 
There is, however, not yet compelling signs of states acknowledging the importance 
of community-based informal water provision systems, let alone incorporating these 
practices to improve access to water. Mapunda et al. (2018), for example, found that 
while over 64 per cent of communities in peri-urban Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, 
regarded informal water systems as important in improving access to water, 60 per 
cent of government affiliated stakeholders were sceptical of the idea, and still regarded 
public water provision as a viable option for the same communities (Mapunda et al., 
2018,). Even though the piped water network traditionally has been seen as the gold 
standard of improved access to water (Kooy, 2014: Liddle et al., 2016) it does not 
seem impossible to achieve both improved access, reliability and quality of water 
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through the informal sector. For example, The United Nations Sustainable 
Development Goals (SDGs) on water and sanitation (goal 6) that aims at achieving 
universal access of safely managed water for all, doesn’t define safely managed as 
managed by a local government, municipality or corporation. Instead, safely manged 
water is defined by reliable, cheap and easy access as well as by the quality of the 
water provided (WHO/UNICEF, 2017). These standards of safe water can potentially 
be met, or failed to be met, both by informal and formal water providers.  
 
This study focuses on the conflicting views on the development of the water sector in 
pursuit of universal access to safe water. The failure of the modern infrastructural 
ideal, both under public and private management, in combination with the persistence 
and growth of the informal water sector could point the state towards more locally-
based and community managed solutions for water provision. To explore the state’s 
attitude and approach towards the urban informal water sector, and how informality is 
taken into consideration in development of the water sector, I have chosen to conduct 
a critical analysis of water development policies in Tanzania and Kenya. These two 
East African countries do not only stand close to each other geographically as 
neighbours, but also perform at a level close to each other in indicators on urban water 
development (WHO/UNICEF), have similar sizes of urban populations and 
urbanisation rates that directly affects the development of water services in urban 
settings and have a similar history of British colonial authorities setting the standards 
of infrastructure development and water management frameworks in cities (Kjellén, 
2006; Nilsson & Nyanchanga, 2008). Interestingly, however, Kenya has in the 21st 
century developed a more commercially based water policy than Tanzania (Sambu & 
Tarhule, 2013; Butcher, 2016), which makes the comparison between these countries 
even more interesting. The choice of Tanzania and Kenya as the subjects of this study 
was also influenced by the rich research on informal water providers in Tanzania, and 
Dar es Salaam in particular, and the case studies on community-based water provision 
models in Kenya (see for example Butcher, 2016).   
 
By focusing on Kenyan and Tanzanian water development policy, I hope to provide a 
better picture of how states in SSA approach informality in the water sector. I also 
hope to open up for the possibility of finding and comparing different approaches to 
informality between the two countries. 
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Research questions 
 
Specifically, this study seeks to answer two interrelated questions:  
 
First: How is the problem of water supply constructed in urban water 
policy in Tanzania and Kenya?   
 
Second, how are Tanzanian and Kenyan water policies approaching the 
informal water sector?  
 
The research material analysed in this thesis consists of four policy documents 
outlining the national water development plans and strategies of Tanzania and Kenya 
published on government websites by the national ministries of water, environment 
and water and irrigation. These two neighbouring countries in East Africa have both 
similar shares of urbanised citizens (33,8 per cent in Tanzania, and 27 per cent in 
Kenya) and rate of urbanisation (5,22 per cent and 4,23 per cent). However, Tanzania 
is both bigger in territory and population and performs slightly worse than Kenya on 
several indicators of development. Tanzania was ranked country number 154 on 
UNDPs development ranking with a Human Development Index (HDI) of 0,538 
compared to Kenya at place 142 with a HDI of 0,590 (UNDP, 2018). Regarding access 
to safely managed water sources Kenya is better off with 54 per cent of the urban 
population having access to safely managed water services compared to 34 per cent in 
Tanzania (WHO/UNICEF, 2017). The same is true when comparing the share of urban 
residents in the two countries with at least basic drinking water services, 83 per cent 
in Kenya and 79 per cent in Tanzania (WHO/UNICEF, 2017).  
 
Even though these official statistics can obscure the reality on the ground by 
overestimating the share of urban population having access to improved water sources 
(Smiley, 2013) or by ignoring the deeper meaning of access to water (Obeng-Odoom, 
2012), they give an indication about where the countries stand in relation to one 
another. While there are differences between Kenya and Tanzania, the similarities in 
some key indicators like demographic pressure and public services (Fund for Peace, 
2018) as well as the political systems (The World Factbook, 2019) suggest that a 
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comparison between the water sector development plans in these two states benefits 
the aim of the study.   
 
The content of the national development plans and the national water development 
plans are analysed using Carol Bacchi’s (2009) WPR approach, or “What’s the 
problem represented to be” approach, which has been widely used in recent policy 
analysis, for example on public drug- and health policies (Lancaster & Ritter, 2014; 
Bacchi, 2015). The WPR approach can expose how policymakers produce the 
problems they set out to solve, by analysing the assumptions underpinning specific 
policy proposals (Bacchi & Goodwin, 2016, 4–6). The water development plans 
included in this study tend not to explicitly address the informal water sector in great 
detail, however, some specific informal practices are addressed and often represented 
as either problems, temporary solutions or possible permanent solutions in the 
development of the water sector and, more broadly, the national economy. By 
analysing how the problems related to developing the water sector in Tanzania and 
Kenya are represented in the countries’ national water development plans, we can form 
a good picture of how these states produce and approach informality in the water 
sector, as well as which methods, if any, the state suggest for “formalising” the water 
sector. 
 
The significance and originality of the research question 
 
The call for governments to acknowledge and incorporate the urban informal water 
sector in water development policies is a fairly recent one (Kjellén, 2006; Allen et al., 
2006; Chakava et al., 2014; Kooy, 2014; Liddle et al., 2016; Mapunda et al., 2018).  
 
Previous studies on water access and informality in SSA have to a great extent focused 
on, the technologies and practices used to obtain water in informal settlements (Bayliss 
& Tukai, 2011; Pauschert et al., 2012; Smiley, 2013; Chakava, 2014; Smiley, 2016; 
Mapunda, 2018), the progress of countries in meeting their development goals under 
private/public management (Kjellén, 2006; Bakker, 2007; Sambu & Tarhule, 2013) 
and experiments with alternative community-based water management models 
(Schwartz & Sanga, 2010; Butcher, 2016; Ifejika et al.,  2018).  
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My thesis, on the other hand, does not only ask a different set of questions, but also 
attempts to answer the questions about water in a different way. By building a bridge 
between informal practices and national policy on water development, I analyse how, 
and if, governments are taking the informal water sector into account in water 
development policies. By answering how the problem of water provision is 
constructed in urban water policy in Tanzania and Kenya, I aim to expose the attitudes 
implicit in government policies toward the informal water sector. This study is, 
therefore, both original and significant in its purpose to test the conclusion drawn by 
previous studies on water informality: that government policies in SSA are not going 
far enough in supporting urban informal water provision systems.  
 
This study is structured in tree parts; a review of the informal water sector in sub-
Saharan Africa, a review of the concepts of informality, informal practices and the 
WPR approach, and finally my own analysis of the urban water policies and how they 
relate to informality in the water sector in Tanzania and Kenya. The following section 
takes a closer look on at informality within the water sector in sub-Saharan Africa and 
provides context by reviewing previous research on the subject. The background 
section is followed by a description of urban informality, informal practices and the 
WPR approach. Finally, the third sector of this study focuses on my own analysis of 
the water sector in the national development plans of Tanzania and Kenya. The final 
chapters connect my own research to urban informality, urban practices and the WPR 
approach.   
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Background 
 
This chapter provides an overview of the different manifestations of the informal urban 
water sector in sub-Saharan Africa, based on case studies of both urban and peri-urban 
settlements. First, I examine the United Nations Sustainable Development Goals 
(SDGs) on clean water and sanitation (Goal 6) and what consequences the definition 
of safely managed water has for how we view water access. Second, the chapter 
provides a description of the water sectors in Kenya and Tanzania followed by a more 
general overview of the informal water sector across urban areas in sub-Saharan 
Africa. The final section looks at examples of co-production of water services between 
communities and the state, or the “formalisation” of the informal water sector. 
 
Safe water in the Sustainable Development Goals  
 
This study analyses the national development plans of two countries in sub-Saharan 
Africa against the backdrop of the SDGs (goal 6). More specifically the first target 
(6.1) to achieve universal and equitable access to safe and affordable drinking water 
for all by 2030. The share of the population using safely managed drinking water 
services is the indicator used for measuring the success of target 6.1. Safely managed, 
in turn, is defined as “drinking water from an improved water source that is located on 
premises, available when needed and free from faecal and priority chemical 
contamination” (WHO/UNICEF, 2017, 8). If the improved source is not located on 
premises, but within a 30 minutes round trip to collect water, the water service is 
defined as basic, and not meeting the requirements of target 6.1 in the SDGs. 
 
An improved water source can include piped water, boreholes or tube wells, protected 
dug wells, protected springs, rainwater, and packaged or delivered water. 
(WHO/UNICEF, 2017). This definition of improved water sources opens up the 
possibility of reaching target 6.1 through the informal water sector, as long as the water 
can be guaranteed to be free from contamination and available when needed. Since 
most of the water provided by the informal sector in sub-Saharan African cities comes 
from unprotected sources, simply protecting these sources could potentially increase 
the access to safely managed water for millions of people.  
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According to data from the Joint Monitoring Programme (JMP) of the United Nations 
(UN), 82 per cent of urban residents in sub-Saharan Africa had access to at least basic 
water services in 2015, i.e. improved water within a 30 minutes’ round trip, and only 
7 per cent relied on unimproved water sources (WHO/UNICEF, 2017).  
 
However, there are some significant flaws in the way SDG 6.1 is measured. For 
example, the JMP data measures the share of a population using safely managed water 
as a primary source. This means that JMP statistics can hide the fact that some of the 
water users with access to safely managed water, in fact might rely on more unsafe 
secondary sources in the case of a power outage, pressure loss or dry period. Adams 
and Smiley (2018) found that even though 60 per cent of peri-urban residents in 
Lilongwe, Malawi, had access to an improved water source from communal water 
kiosks, 15 per cent of the same people used unprotected wells as a back-up source for 
drinking water. Taking secondary water sources into account therefore reveals a 
greater inequality in water access behind the official statistics.   
 
Even though the SDGs on water and sanitation works as the general references for 
successful expansion of water services on a global scale leading up to 2030, the water 
sector development plans analysed in this thesis are formulated against the backdrop 
of the UNs previous, Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). The MDG on access 
to water (Target 7.C) is to halve the proportion of the population without access to safe 
drinking water. The definition of “access to water” in the MDGs differs from the 
SDGs. The MDG target 7 defines access to water as the availability of at least 20 litres 
per person per day from a source within one kilometre of the users (Dar & Khan, 2011). 
This is good to keep in mind in the review and analysis of water policies formulated 
against the backdrop of the MDGs. 
 
The water sectors in Tanzania and Kenya  
 
While there are many similarities between Tanzania and Kenya in how the informal 
water sector operates and how many urban residents have access to safely managed 
water, the two countries differ in their approach to private and public management of 
services.   
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The water sector Tanzania, specifically in Dar es Salaam, is a good example of the 
complexity and heterogeneity of water provision systems in urban areas in sub-
Saharan Africa. On the one hand, the formal water provision capacity through the 
piped network is growing fast and alternative models of community-managed water 
systems are being explored. But on the other, the city suffers from chronic water 
shortages, unreliable supply and poor infrastructure (Smiley, 2013). The vast majority 
of peri-urban residents rely on informal water sources while urbanization, population 
growth and climate change makes it even harder to provide everyone with safe water.  
 
Approximately 75–80 per cent of the population in Dar es Salaam live in informal 
settlements with extremely limited access to formal water supply (Allen, 2017), where 
residents rely on informal water systems that depend almost exclusively on 
groundwater (Mapunda et al., 2018), like shallow wells or boreholes. To meet the 
growing demand for water, driven by urbanisation and population growth, the formal 
utility, Dar es Salaam Water and Sewage Corporation (DAWASCO), increased its 
water production capacity from 300 million litres/day in 2014 to 510 million l/d in 
2017. However, the average production in 2017 remained at just 357 million l/d. The 
increase of piped water household connections has been much faster, from 
approximately 122 000 connections in 2016 to almost 264 500 in 2017, illustrating the 
failure of DAWASCO to increase water supply in pace with growing demand (Smiley, 
2018). The existing piped water network mainly benefits high-income areas in the city, 
while 90 per cent of residents in informal low-income urban and peri-urban spaces rely 
on alternative water sources to meet their daily needs (Allen, 2017; Smiley, 2018). The 
coping strategies of residents in peri-urban Dar es Salaam range from buying water 
from community-managed kiosks and boreholes to informal street vendors or shallow 
unprotected wells to access drinking water. While state-affiliated stakeholders 
generally see the informal water sector as a temporary phenomenon that will disappear 
when the piped network reaches everyone (Mapunda et al., 2018), the relationship 
between authorities and communities is more nuanced than that.  
 
Similarly, in Nairobi, Kenya, the formal piped network run by the Nairobi City Water 
and Sewerage Company has historically struggled to provide access to safe water for 
all, with less than half of the urban population having a household connection in 2006 
(McGranahan et al., 2006). Around 60 per cent of the population in Nairobi live in 
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informal settlements with limited access to water services (Crow & Odaba, 2010). The 
fact that the city’s water utility is run by a private company, does not seem to have 
made a big difference compared to the public utility in Dar es Salaam. In Nairobi's 
biggest informal settlement Kibera, the cost of water is nearly as high as the rent, 
sometimes forcing households to reduce their food intake to one meal a day to be able 
to pay for water (Crow & Odaba, 2010). 
 
In Kenya, urban informal settlements face the same problems and challenges with 
access to safe water as in Tanzania. On a state-level however, Kenya has chosen a 
different approach to water management, preferring privatization and public-private 
partnerships in the water sector (Butcher, 2016). The foundation of most water 
development in Kenya is the Water Act of 2002. This is also true for the Kenyan policy 
documents analysed in this study. The Water Act of 2002 defined cost recovery as a 
core principle of sustainable water provision (Butcher, 2016) and privatized water 
services by establishing autonomous Water Service Providers, or WSPs (Sambu & 
Tarhule, 2012). These WSPs are supervised by Water Service Boards (WSBs) that 
operate as private commercial enterprises, and in turn are regulated by the Water 
Services Regulatory Board (WASREB) (Sambu & Tarhule, 2012). However, the focus 
on increasing access to water by privatisation of water services, has not been 
completely successful in Kenya during the 21st century. While some of the WSPs have 
made progress, many suffer from high-ratios of non-revenue water (NRW), are 
operating below their capacity or are too small to be economically viable (Sambu & 
Tarhule, 2012). Other challenges connected to the privatisation of water services in 
Kenya are the lack of commitment to expand access to low-income consumer, inequity 
in service quality based on the ability to pay, weak regulatory oversight and a lack of 
accountability to local customer needs (Nyangena, 2008).  
 
While Tanzania has chosen a different approach in choosing public water management 
rather than private, there has been some experiments with privatisation. Between the 
mid-2000s and 2018, the piped water network in Dar es Salaam was managed by two 
public entities, the Dar es Salaam Water and Sewage Corporation (DAWASCO) which 
operated and maintained the network and by the Dar es Salaam Water and Sewage 
Authority (DAWASA) that owns the infrastructure. DAWASCO was formed in 2005, 
after the government terminated a 10-year contract that had been awarded to a 
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company called City Water, less than 2 years earlier as part of a World Bank 
privatisation deal (Dill, 2010). In the fall of 2018, DAWASCO and DAWASA were 
merged to cut expenditures and improve water services in the city (Rweyemamu, 
2018) and the newly formed water authority simply goes by the name the Dar es 
Salaam Water and Sewage Authority or DAWASA. Even though the water services in 
Tanzania are provided by public utilities, the policy documents analysed in this study 
calls for the commercialisation and increased financial autonomy of these utilities to 
make them more efficient in securing investment and raising water tariffs.  
 
The informal water sector in sub-Saharan Africa  
 
This study builds upon the definition of urban informality as practices associated with 
water services that exist outside of what the state regards as legitimate. In this sense, 
the informal water sector can be broadly described as all practices connected to 
accessing water in other ways than buying it directly from a formal utility run by the 
state or a private corporation. These practices can vary greatly, for example from 
relying on a combination of surface water and street vendors to owning a private 
borehole or buying water from a connected neighbour, but they all have in common 
that they do not hold any official legal status (Kooy, 2014; Misra, 2014).  
 
With an expected annual urban population growth of over 4 per cent in the major cities 
in sub-Saharan Africa (SSA), the urban population is expected to reach 1 billion by 
2050 (Dos Santos et al., 2017) and access to water in the region is likely to remain 
heavily influenced by rapid urbanization in the coming decades. Besides the 
urbanisation rates, other intersecting factors like persistent poverty and ineffective 
governance also affect the access, or lack of access, to safe water in urban areas 
(Kjellén, 2006).   
 
A majority, 62 per cent, of the urban population in SSA lives in informal settlements 
(Dos Santos et al., 2017), where access to safe water is limited and informal 
community-based systems are the main water supply source (Liddle et al., 2016). 
While many households in the urban cores of SSA at least have the option of being 
connected to the formal piped network, the expansion of this ‘urban infrastructural 
ideal’ to more peripheral and informal urban settlements have largely failed (Kooy, 
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2014) worsening problems of access to safe water in peri-urban neighbourhoods. The 
piped water network has struggled to achieve financial sustainability due to leaks, 
unregistered customers and poor management (Kjellén, 2006), both under public and 
private service providers (Kooy, 2014; Liddle et al., 2016; Allen et al. 2017; Adams 
& Smiley, 2018). The un-connected, urban residents instead have to access water by a 
variety of different coping mechanisms (Liddle et al., 2016), like purchasing water 
from vendors, buying it from a neighbour with a pipe connection or fetching it from a 
borehole or a water kiosk. The people, or entrepreneurs, running the informal water 
supply systems are sometimes referred to as small-scale independent water providers, 
SSIPs, that fill the gap in service delivery left by the formal utility’s failure to expand 
services in growing cities (Ahlers et al., 2013). For example, in the peri-urban areas of 
Greater Maputo, Mozambique, SSIPs serve an estimated 31 per cent of the population 
with water (Ahlers et al., 2013). While many cities in SSA share the same general 
features regarding population growth and insufficient formal water supply systems, 
the coping mechanisms and consequences for urban residents can vary greatly, even 
on a neighbourhood-level. Next, we take a closer look at different examples of how 
informal water systems manifest themselves in different places and what consequences 
they can have for urban residents in informal settlements.  
 
Strategies for accessing water 
 
Strategies for accessing water can vary greatly between regions, cities, 
neighbourhoods, communities and income-groups. As noted above, official statistics 
usually provide only one primary source of water per household, but in reality, most 
households rely on a combination of several water sources to meet their daily needs 
(Table 1). A family can choose to pay high prices for bottled water for drinking 
purposes while still choosing to use water from more risky sources for cleaning-
purposes. 
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Table 1 Water abstraction methods in 17 communities in Ndola, Zambia 
Source Drinking water (%) Domestic water (%) 
Shallow well 68,6 75,4 
Borehole 11 4,3 
River 0,7 0,7 
Spring 0,7 0,7 
KWSC leaking pipe 0,7 0,7 
Dambo (i.e. wetland) 0 0 
A combination of the above 9,7 9,4 
Source: Liddle (2016), n=152 
 
A case-study on different water access strategies in rich and poor communities in Dar 
es Salaam (Nanyanyuka et al., 2014) identified a total of 28 different access strategies, 
6 water sources and 10 intermediaries that provided the water. The most typical access 
strategies when the piped water is unavailable or failing in the communities studied 
were: drilling or digging of private wells, installing water pumps and reserve tanks, 
buying water from vendors, buying water from connected neighbours, buying water 
from mosques, buying packaged water and lastly using illegal connections or stealing 
water (Nanyanyuka et al., 2014) 
 
Private wells and boreholes 
 
Hand-dug shallow wells are one of the dominating water accessing strategies in urban 
the informal water sector (Liddle, 2016). Digging shallow wells is strongly associated 
with rural practices that have been incorporated within urban communities as a result 
of urbanisation (Liddle, 2016). The wells vary in depth, depending on the groundwater 
level, but the quality and quantity of water from shallow wells is generally low in 
developing nations (Galiani et al., 2005). In Ndola, Zambia, 68,6 per cent of surveyed 
households used water from shallow wells for drinking purposes, with 51 per cent of 
users believing their water was of acceptable taste and quality while 49 per cent 
thought it was not (Liddle, 2016). The water quality of shallow wells is largely 
determined by the well’s proximity to contaminating sources, as well as the type of 
internal and surrounding protection of the well as well as its cover. In Ndola, all studied 
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wells lacked internal casing, almost 50 per cent had no surrounding pavement other 
than earth and 22 per cent did not even have a cover (Liddle, 2016).   
 
While the hand-dug shallow wells in Ndola generally serve a just one or a few 
households, deeper private wells with connected pipes can serve whole communities. 
Mapunda et al., (2018) found that private wells had become de facto small-scale 
utilities in peri-urban sub-wards in Dar es Salaam, where the owners stored water from 
wells in tanks and distributed it to households through privately owned “spaghetti-
networks”. Shallow wells are therefore not only a primary source of informal water 
that private households resort to, but a water source utilized by vendors that distribute 
the well water to unconnected communities. In Festac Town in Lagos, Nigeria, 85 per 
cent of water vendors used wells as their main water source with 66 per cent of the 
water sold coming from unprotected wells vulnerable to contamination (Olajuyigbe et 
al., 2012).  
 
In Lilongwe, Malawi, kiosks are the main source of water peri-urban informal 
settlements, but wells are the primary back-up source among boreholes, rainwater, and 
private household taps (Adams & Boateng, 2018). Some 15 per cent of the households 
using wells as a back-up water source use unprotected wells (Adams & Smiley, 2018). 
Wells are also used as an alternative water source by households that are connected to 
the centralised piped network in Dar es Salaam, even though the quality is often poorer 
and the water salty (Nanyanyuka et al., 2014). 
 
Accessing water through boreholes is the other main informal water access strategy 
that relies on groundwater extraction and is used in urban and peri-urban areas across 
SSA. Boreholes are constructed using a drill and are superior to wells in that they are 
much deeper and often have better protection from contamination.  Boreholes are often 
regarded as one of the safest informal water supply sources, but due to high 
construction costs, boreholes are non-existent in poor-areas that lack NGO aid (Liddle, 
2016). A study of 19 boreholes in poor urban settlements on Nairobi, Kenya, estimated 
the average cost for a 230-meter deep borehole to be 27 500 US dollars (USD). A 
majority of the users regarded the water source as both reliable and accessible, 
however, the water prices were unpredictable and the quality did not match the criteria 
for safe drinking water (Chakava et al., 2014). In Ndola, Zambia, the construction 
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costs of small-scale private boreholes are approximately 5000 USD, which is 
considerably less than the big rigs in Nairobi costs, but still more than most residents 
could ever afford (Liddle, 2016). Due to the high construction costs, boreholes are 
usually run by the more affluent SSIPs (such as local entrepreneur or community 
groups), NGOs or the public utility. Water from boreholes is usually sold directly to 
customers from kiosks and vendors (Chakava et al., 2014).  
 
While boreholes and wells constitute the main water sources for many in informal 
settlements, households are not always able to access the water themselves, and 
therefore have to rely on different intermediaries to get the water they need (Table 2). 
These intermediaries are generally referred to as water vendors. Note that all but one 
of the water access strategies in Table 2 rely completely on water from wells, even 
though the water is resold by vendors.  
 
Table 2 Water access strategies in 3 peri-urban areas in Dar es Salaam 
Households water access   (%) 
Pipe-connected household from private wells 28,8 
Tankers/trucks from DAWASCO or wells 7,8 
Push carts/bicycles from wells 6,5 
Purchased in 20-L buckets from wells 42,5 
Fetched from open shallow wells 14,4 
Source: Mapunda et al. 2018) n= 153 
Water vendors 
 
In the water literature, vending refers to the reselling or onward distribution of utility 
water, or the selling of water from other sources (Kjellén, 2006). Water vending does 
not refer to the formal utility selling water directly to customers. The term water 
vendor is usually used to describe the so-called travelling pushcart vendors, that sell 
water from containers or in sachets door-to-door. However, buying water from tanker 
trucks that regularly bring water to neighbourhoods or fetching it from a near-by water 
kiosk, sometimes referred to as a standpipe, can also be considered buying from water 
vendors. In the cases were water kiosks are run and controlled by the formal water 
utility, these are not referred to as water vendors but as the formal water supply.  
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One of the most common ways to purchase water from vendors is in 20-L buckets or 
containers (Mapunda et al., 2018), but sometimes, water vendors also sell water 
packaged in bottles or plastic sachets. In Dar es Salaam, water kiosks were originally 
introduced by the formal water utility DAWASCO, but Nanyanyuka et al (2014) found 
that many private actors running the formal kiosks got actually their water from 
informal sources like tanker trucks or illegal connections. Most of the water sold by 
pushcart vendors comes from connected households that are able to resell some of their 
water, followed by water from kiosks (Kjellén, 2006). A case-study of two high-
income streets and two low-income streets in Dar es Salaam identified buying water 
from vendors as the primary access strategy during breakdowns of the formal water 
system (Nanyanyuka et al., 2014).  
 
The need for households to use water vendors to access water is largely determined by 
the distance to the formal water supply (Kjellén, 2006; Schwartz & Sanga, 2010). 
Pushcart vendors usually operate in the poorest areas, where piped water infrastructure 
is scarce or absent, and customers in these areas generally appear to be grateful for 
vendor services, with less than half of the pushcart vendors getting complaints 
(Kjellén, 2006). However, not every urban area is suitable for vendors. In a case-study 
of three areas in peri-urban Dar es Salaam, only one had travelling vendors since the 
two others were too hilly and sparsely developed for vending to be suitable (Mapunda, 
2018). Pushcart vendors usually use carts fitted with bicycle wheels that can carry 6–
12 20-L containers, which means that the weight of a fully loaded pushcart can reach 
120–240 kg. This is perhaps the reason that it is usually young men that work as 
vendors (Kjellén, 2006). In Dar es Salaam, over 90 per cent of pushcart vendors are 
20–25 years old and depend on vending to support themselves (Mapunda, 2018). 
Buying water from vendors is generally the most expensive accessing strategy 
(Kjellén, 2006), as outlined in greater detail below.  
 
Health vulnerability 
 
Households connected to the formal piped network often still experience varying 
availability of water (Nanyanyuka et al., 2014; Smiley, 2018), due to factors like water 
pressure loss during power-outages or failure of the water service to produce enough 
water to meet the demand. These households often rely on alternative back-up sources 
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from informal water sector. However, availability and also accessibility, i.e. when 
water is available and how long it takes to fetch it, can be even more volatile in the 
informal water sector and have a greater impact on the life of the end user. Relying on 
informal water sources often comes with increased vulnerability both in terms of 
health due to a higher risk of contamination, and economy due to higher water prices.  
 
The quality of the water from informal provision systems is rarely monitored as closely 
as water from the formal supply system, and many informal sources, like unprotected 
wells, are more vulnerable to contamination. Relying on informal water sources is 
therefore connected to a high rate of waterborne diseases like diarrhoea (Olajuyigbe 
2012; Chakava et al., 2014; Liddle, 2016; Mapunda et al., 2018). Even the proximity 
of the water source can have large health-impacts for households, with time spent 
fetching water being an indicator of child mortality. Pickering & Davis (2012) found 
that a 15-minute decrease in one-way walk time to the water source is associated with 
a relative reduction in diarrhoea prevalence by 41 per cent and a 11 per cent relative 
reduction in under-five child mortality. The high risks related to informal water 
provision systems also means that improvements in water quality also has the potential 
of improving the general well-being of people that rely on the informal water sector. 
In fact, having access to water on-premises results in fever parasitic worm infections, 
less diarrhoea and greater child stature (Overbo et al., 2016).  
 
Accessing water from unprotected shallow wells or directly from surface-sources like 
rivers is the riskiest strategy in terms of health. These sources are vulnerable to 
contamination, especially during floods when contaminated water easily get mixed 
with the water in the well. In a case study of Festac Town in Lagos, Nigeria, some 
form of waterborne disease was observed in 44 per cent of the households relying on 
water vendors that used open wells as their primary source. 10 per cent suffered from 
diarrhoea, 18,6 per cent of typhoid fever and under ten per cent suffered from stomach 
ache or cholera (Olajuyigbe 2012, 236). 
 
A case-study on water supply systems in peri-urban Dar es Salaam found that deep 
wells and boreholes were often poorly constructed and that the owners did not use any 
reliable water quality tests before use, other than the water’s physical appearance 
(Mapunda et al., 2018). Most wells and boreholes were also located in valleys and 
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close to sanitary facilities, which increases the risk of faecal contamination of the 
extracted groundwater (Mapunda et al., 2018). Liddle (2016) found that in Ndola, 
Zambia, water users in informal settlements understand the risks associated with 
groundwater contamination and the need to protect their wells and treat their water. 
However, the follow up has been limited due to lacking support from authorities 
(Liddle, 2016).  
 
While not being as unsafe as unprotected wells, private boreholes can also come with 
increased health risks. Chakava et al., (2014) sampled water from 9 boreholes, all 
located in poor settlements in Nairobi, Kenya, and found that none of the samples met 
the WHO guidelines on safe drinking water. 32 per cent of users had experienced 
diarrhoea, many of them because they did not treat the water before drinking it, as 
borehole water is generally regarded as safe to drink (Chakava et al., 2014). The 
households surveyed also spent up to 10 per cent of their income on medical expenses, 
mostly to tackle diarrhoea.  
 
The high vulnerability regarding health associated with long water-fetching trips and 
unprotected water sources in the informal water sector suggests that protecting water 
sources and bringing them closer to households should be a priority of the state, if it is 
willing to support the informal water sector.  
 
Water prices 
 
In addition to health risks, the informal water sector is also associated with economic 
vulnerability. Water prices vary heavily depending on the source type, which often 
benefits higher-income neighbourhoods and households connected to a formal water 
supply, while the poorest households end up paying the highest prices for water 
(Adams et al., 2018). All case-studies mentioned in this chapter shows higher prices 
per unit of water in the informal sector compared to the formal supply, either because 
of higher fees, more middlemen or the high price of constructing private boreholes or 
wells (Nanyanyuka et al., 2014; Liddle et al., 2016; Allen, 2017; Emenike et al., 2017; 
Adams & Smiley, 2018: Smiley, 2018).  
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For example, in Dar es Salaam, 90 per cent of the population in low-income 
settlements rely on informal water sources at a considerably higher price than the 
official utility charges per unit of water (Allen et al., 2017). A case-study of peri-urban 
neighbourhoods in Malawi (Adams & Smiley, 2018) showed that households 
depending on communal water kiosks paid between 50 and 100 MWK per day, or up 
to 3000 MWK (8 USD) per month, while households paying a flat rate water bill paid 
on average just 1 200 MWK (3 USD) per month, even though there were some price 
fluctuation between different peri-urban villages. In both Arusha (Tanzania), Dodowa 
(Ghana) and Kampala (Uganda), water prices also vary between members of 
communities based on social status with tenants paying more for their water than 
landowners, which in turn can drive tenants to use more risky or contaminated water 
sources (Silvestri et al., 2018). A case study of two communities in Dar es Salaam 
showed how households in the poorest areas can pay up to ten times more per unit of 
water than households in the richest areas pay for water from the formal piped network 
(Nganyanyuka et al., 2014). Gender also plays an important role, and in both Arusha, 
Dodowa and Kampala inequalities were identified in regard to women not having the 
same bargaining power as men (Silvestri et al., 2018). However, in some communities 
the responsibility of handling water can also work the other way around to empower 
women (Butcher, 2016).  
 
While households fetching and purchasing water from kiosks, boreholes or standpipes 
generally pay more for their water than those with household water connections, the 
ones relying on vendors that sell water in bottles, sachets or 20-liter containers 
generally pay the most. In Nairobi, Kenya, water purchased from vendors costs 10 
times more than water from the piped network, and in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, it is 
almost 30 times more expensive (Adams et al., 2018).  
 
The size of the household naturally also impacts the cost and access to water. A study 
on access to safe water in Ado-Odo Ota, Nigeria, showed that bigger households were 
more vulnerable, with an increase in the number of household occupants indicating an 
increase of approximately 31 per cent in the probability of non-regular access to water 
(Emenike et al., 2017). While it can seem obvious that a household in a high-income 
neighbourhood with functioning infrastructure pay less per unit of water through their 
tap than a low-income household that relies on a street vendor to access water does, 
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inequalities also exists on a neighbourhood-level. As outlined below, households 
connected to the piped water network through secondary pipes and middle-men in 
Kisumu, Kenya, paid three times less than their community-peers that happened to live 
further away from the pipes and therefore relied on purchasing water from a kiosk 
(Schwartz & Sanga 2010).  
 
Although bringing more reliable and formal water sources to areas that previously 
relied on vendors does mean lower prices, it won’t necessarily lower the household’s 
expenses on water services. In Dar es Salaam, 53 per cent of households surveyed in 
three neighbourhoods actually paid more for their water after they gained access to the 
piped network between 2014 and 2017, due to both increased family sizes and easier 
access which resulted in a higher consumption (Smiley, 2018).   
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Table 3 Water Prices (Tsh/l) in two communities in Dar es Salaam 
Source: Nganyanyuka et al (2014). (1000 Tsh equals approx. 0.43 USD) 
 
While water prices can vary significantly between regions, cities, neighbourhoods, 
communities and even between neighbours, the highest price is generally paid by those 
living furthest away from formal water sources, who are often also the poorest 
residents. In addition to increasing cost-vulnerability, the high prices paid to water 
kiosks and vendors can also push households towards using more unsafe sources like 
unprotected wells or even surface-water for their daily needs, which further increases 
health-vulnerability. 
 
Formalising the informal through community-based models 
 
Responding to the conceived problem of informality, policy makers have sought out 
tactics to “formalise” the informal economy. In Tanzania, policy makers’ focus on the 
formal-informal divide has led to a fixation on formalisation, understood as 
formalisation of businesses, which includes the requirement for registered businesses 
to have a fixed physical and postal address and registered assets (Steiler, 2018).  
 
The need for a physical address to be regarded as formal, or legal, excludes a big 
proportion of street traders in Dar es Salaam from the possibility of being regarded as 
formal, rendering them incompatible with the modern economy and legal system 
(Steiler, 2018). Steiler’s (2018) study of informal street trade in Dar es Salaam shows 
that this conception of street trade as illegitimate clashes with how the traders 
Water source Affluent  streets Poor  streets  
Osterbay Masaki Mkudunge Nyambwera 
House connection 
(piped water) 
1.007 1.007 – – 
Stand pipes – – 2.5 – 25 2.5 – 10 
Piped water from 
pushcart vendors 
– – 12.5 – 35 12.5 – 15 
Well water from 
pushcart vendors 
– – 2.5 – 10 1.23 – 5 
Tankers 6 – 8 6 – 8 15.0 – 
Bottled water 600 – 
1000 
600 – 1000 600 – 1000 600 – 1000 
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themselves see the legality and legitimacy of their work. Building on Steiler’s (2018) 
study of formalisation policies in Tanzania, we can assume that applied to water 
vendors, these kinds of formalisation policies would be equally unfruitful, since small-
scale water vendors are likely to face similar problems with fixed addresses and assets.  
 
However, if we define formalisation policies more broadly to encompass the state’s 
attempts to include some alternative water management models and informal 
arrangements at a community-level in their water provision, we find some evidence of 
successful attempts to formalise the informal water sector. Especially community-
based models, that aim to work out the best water provision solutions according to the 
need of local communities, have been studied in different parts of the world (Allen, 
2017; Adams & Smiley, 2018). Many community-based models have been successful 
in expanding water services in informal settlements, but they do run the risk of 
providing the state with an excuse to withdraw its responsibilities from these areas. 
This section focuses on experiences from different community-based water provision 
schemes in SSA. 
 
Community-based models either consist of community self-help schemes or the more 
popular and effective alternative: some form of co-production between communities 
and the state, attempting to enhance water supply in underserved communities (Adams 
et al., 2018). The co-production partnerships between communities and the water-
utility are often referred to as community-public partnerships (CPPs). Co-production 
basically means citizen participation in public service delivery with the state or public 
agencies (Adams & Smiley, 2018), but for the purposes of this chapter, it seems 
suitable to use the more precise definition of institutionalized co-production. Joshi 
(2004) defines institutionalized co-production as “the provision of public services 
(broadly defined, to include regulation) through a regular long-term relationship 
between state agencies and organized groups of citizens where both make substantial 
resource contributions”. The concept of institutionalized co-production lets us break 
free from the normative assumption that unorthodox forms of public organisation are 
undesirable and ineffective relics of ‘traditional’ arrangements, and instead helps us 
explore what in many parts of the world constitute the best available alternatives 
(Joshi, 2004). This reasoning of taking institutionalised co-production arrangements 
more seriously (Joshi, 2004), resonates strikingly well with more recent calls for the 
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state to acknowledge the informal water sector as an alternative where the urban 
infrastructural ideal of a piped network has failed (Chakava et al., 2014; Kooy, 2014; 
Liddle et al., 2016; Mapunda et al., 2018). The co-production between communities 
and the state is an appealing idea because of its potential to be a win-win solution that 
improves service delivery, enhances participation, creates employment and well-being 
while at the same time enabling formal utilities to expand their customer base (Adams 
et al., 2018).   
 
Building on the idea of a win-win situation, international lending agencies like the 
World Bank and the African Development Bank have often propagated for the so-
called “formalisation” of the informal economy, through what Ahlers et al. (2013) call 
the ‘legalist approach’ to formalisation. According to the ‘legalist approach’ 
informality is primarily a form of untapped liquid capital, that should be unleashed by 
the formal legal system integrated in the capitalist system to boost the economy as a 
whole (Ahlers et al., 2013). However, as I argue below, both urban informality and the 
processes associated with “formalisation” or community-public partnerships are much 
more complex than the legalist approach suggests.  
 
There is some evidence of benefits from CPPs especially in the urban water sector. 
Co-production has improved accountability and information flow between service 
providers and users, it has enabled urban communities to participate more actively in 
water policy formulation and opened up economic opportunities for active participants 
to found local water provision businesses (Adams & Smiley, 2018). However, CPPs 
can easily be undermined when participants do not act in good faith, for example when 
the state uses CPPs to get rid of its service responsibilities in challenging areas, when 
community elites takes control to prioritize certain areas over others (Adams & 
Smiley, 2018) or when the partnership is designed primarily to take control over the 
informal water sector rather than strengthening its capacity (Ahlers et al., 2013). In the 
case of Dar es Salaam, CPPs have often been successful in improving service 
provision, especially in low-income informal settlements, but these schemes still suffer 
from too little state involvement and support, leaving communities on their own after 
the initial investment in small-scale infrastructure (Dill, 2010; Allen, 2017; Adams et 
al., 2018) 
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In Lilongwe, Malawi, a CPP promoted by the state in 2006 to create opportunities for 
communities to actively participate in water service delivery to enhance water supply 
in informal urban settlements has led to improvements in both pricing, distance to 
water sources, efficiency, financial accountability and management transparency. But 
while the price of water fell, the number of water kiosks in Lilongwe increased and 
their opening hours improved in areas that used the CPP-model, interruptions in water 
supply worsened and waiting lines grew (Adams & Smiley, 2018). While the model 
improved participation its biggest challenges lied with poor infrastructure and limited 
capacity of informal settlements to address problems (Adams & Smiley, 2018). The 
experience of CPPs in Lilongwe suggest that community-bases systems can improve 
some aspects of access to safe water, but they cannot be regarded as perfect models in 
urban informal settlements (Adams & Smiley, 2018). Urban water systems are too 
complex for the state to act passively (Adams & Smiley, 2018), especially when it 
comes to supporting and investing in water infrastructure.   
 
Municipal-community partnerships are also common across the informal settlements 
of Dar es Salaam. In these partnerships, the city supports community-managed 
boreholes either through municipal teams working on issues of water, health, 
education and community development, or the pro-poor units of DAWASCO (Allen, 
2017). Most of the community-managed water schemes are boreholes, where water is 
pumped to storage tanks from where it either flows to distribution points across the 
settlement, or is being extracted by water vendors. These systems are usually 
established by NGOs or DAWASCO and managed by local community-bases 
organisations (CBOs) such as water user associations or water committees (Allen, 
2017). In settlements located closer to formal water sources, the community-based 
water systems often take the form of “middlemen” constructing and maintaining a 
network of secondary pipes in informal settlements (Dill, 2010). The city’s 
community-based schemes have often been successful (Dill, 2010; Adams et al., 
2018), but the co-production usually does not get the level of state support it needs, in 
terms of repair and maintenance as well as financial resources to pay electricity costs, 
water vendors and security personnel, since these systems are often expected to 
support themselves (Allen, 2017).  
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The Delegated Management Model 
 
The delegated management model (DMM) is a form of public-private partnership that 
aims at expanding water service provision under community-management and 
generating business opportunities for lower-income residents (Butcher, 2016). In 
accordance to the model, the former water utility delivers bulk water from master 
meters (the formal piped network) to small-scale providers, so called Master Operators 
or MOs, that are approved or appointed by community associations. These MOs are 
responsible for managing the next step in the supply chain, by connecting and charging 
households closest to the master meters or selling water to standpipes and kiosks that 
are operated as separate businesses (Schwartz & Sanga, 2010; Butcher, 2016). The 
general idea is that the public utility delegates responsibility of water management to 
the MOs that are in turn incentivized to construct and maintain secondary water 
provision networks in informal settlement. This significantly reduces risk from the 
utility’s point of view while still providing informal settlements with formal and safe 
water. The model has been introduced with support from NGOs in several sub-Saharan 
African countries including Ghana, Mozambique and Kenya (Butcher, 2016).  
 
With the introduction of a Pro-Poor Implementation Plan (PPIP) for Water Supply and 
Sanitation, policy-makers in Kenya stated their intention to replace informal systems 
with formal small-scale providers (Butcher, 2016). The preference of building more 
market-based water management solutions and using small scale providers to deliver 
“pro-poor” services, has opened the door for the delegated management model in 
Kenya.  
 
Two case-studies on local-level experiments with the DMM in Kisumu, Kenya, shows 
how community-based water management both can increase the quality and quantity 
of water services and deepen democratic practice on a community-level (Schwartz & 
Sanga, 2010; Butcher, 2016). Both studies showed a significant service expansion and 
improvement to unconnected households, increased revenue for the formal utility and 
increased employment as well as a reinforced level of ownership and solidarity within 
the community. In the neighbourhood of Kondele, the DMM has had positive 
consequences for women and girls, that are primarily responsible for daily decision-
making related to water use and collection (Butcher, 2016). In addition to improving 
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water access, the DMM has allowed some women to participate more in income-
generating activities, such as managing water kiosks. The community-managed 
system has also provided more flexibility for customers to take water on credit if 
necessary, since it is easier to negotiate with community-members than to do so 
directly with the formal utility (Butcher, 2016).  
 
But the DMM is far from a perfect model, and also comes with new challenges. 
Schwartz & Sanga (2010) noted corruption among some MOs in one neighbourhood 
as well as some mistrust among the community towards the MOs. The DMM also 
increased inequalities in how much households paid for their water. As the households 
with higher incomes tend to be located closer to dense urban areas and in this case, the 
master meters, these households have the possibility of being connected to the MOs 
secondary network. However, the poorer households that are located further away 
from the master meter, have to rely on standpipes and kiosks where they pay up to 
three times more for water than their more well-off peers (Schwartz & Sanga 2010). 
In Kisumu, Kenya, the transition to the DMM has been supported by NGOs. But in 
places that lack outside financing, the initial investment in infrastructure may not be 
possible which could potentially undermine the whole model. According to Schwartz 
& Sanga (2010) the DMM relies on infrastructure development to create suitable 
conditions improved service expansion and billing-collection efficiency. Increased 
commitment of the state to support the capacity of communities managing their own 
water systems as well as a solution to the differences in water pricing between 
connected and unconnected household is needed to make the DMM a sustainable 
model (Schwartz & Sanga, 2010; Butcher, 2016). 
 
In greater Maputo, Mozambique, the implementation of a delegated management 
model benefitted the largest small-scale service providers, that had the economic 
means to ‘become formal’ and integrate with the water utility through the DMM. The 
model focused primarily on licensing informal providers and paid little attention to 
service improvement (Ahlers et al., 2013). Smaller actors within the informal water 
sector could not necessarily cope with the added license fees and taxes associated with 
‘going formal’, while also not being willing to abandon their investments in boreholes 
and small-scale infrastructure. This dilemma can potentially drive the smallest 
informal actors towards an even deeper form of informality (Ahlers et al., 2013). 
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Ahlers et al. (2013) also found that the formalisation policies in Mozambique did little 
to protect customers that rely on the informal sector and instead focused more on 
taking control over the informal economy, which in turn is likely to result in end 
consumers paying even more for their water instead of improving access and lowering 
prices. Rather than improving services, the community-based model of delegated 
management was primarily used in Maputo as a tool to gain more control over the 
informal water sector, while expansion of the formal piped network to the whole city 
was still the primary target of the authorities, a tactic that I have argued above is not 
likely to work. The experiences from Maputo contradicts the argument of the legalist 
approach, supported by the World Bank and The African Development Bank, that 
formalization ultimately will benefit customers (Ahlers et al., 2013).  
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Research approach and conceptual framework 
 
My approach in this research project builds upon practice theory and Carol Bacchi’s 
(2009) poststructuralist approach to analysing policy. From this standpoint, water 
consumers and policy makers are viewed as having both agency and being driven by 
structures. According to this practice theoretical view, people do what makes sense to 
them to do, to understand the social world. This approach allows me to both critically 
analyse the state’s attitudes towards the informal water sector and the water policies 
proposed in the national water development plans, while also acknowledging the 
state’s role in reproducing informalities.  
 
The poststructuralist premise of this approach rejects the idea that policy proposals are 
responses from governments to solve problems in society. Instead the approach 
critically interrogates the political dimensions of ‘problems’ implicitly represented in 
policy proposals as value-loaded assumptions that determine how societies are 
governed (Bacchi, 2009, 31–32). This does not mean that the approach denies the 
existence of troubling conditions the require a response. What is does is to suggest that 
these conditions can be represented as problems in very different ways, based on the 
assumptions of policy makers, that in turn define how policies are formulated. To take 
the informal water sector as an example, this poststructuralist approach to analysing 
policy suggests that both the definition of informality as something illegal, the 
definition of water access as connection to a piped network as well as the idea that 
water policy proposals are objective responses to real problems needs to be questioned.  
  
Urban informality  
 
This study uses the concepts of “the informal water sector” and “informal water 
sources” to describe practices connected to accessing water that exist outside the 
definition of what the state regards as legitimate water provision, or the formal water 
sector. The concept of informality covers a wide-ranging scale of economic activity, 
from marginal operations to large enterprises, that takes place in tight exchange with 
the formal sector, not outside of it (Hart, 1973). In the urban water sector informality 
includes everything from using buckets to get water from rivers or ponds (surface 
water), collecting water from hand-dug wells and springs, using boreholes, harvesting 
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rainwater or even purchasing water in cans, bottles or sachets from small-scale street 
vendors.  
 
The concept of informal activities is by no means a straight-forward one and different 
authors and organizations often define informality in different ways, depending on 
their objectives. Using the term “informality” or “informal economy” is often far from 
neutral, especially when the concepts is used to achieve political goals (Steiler, 2018). 
By definition, income opportunities outside formal employment must include certain 
kinds of criminal, or illegitimate, activities. However, Hart’s (1973) typology of urban 
income opportunities distinguish between legitimate and illegitimate activities in the 
informal sector, depending on what is generally accepted by the public, with small-
scale water vending and even large-scale informal water truck operations falling under 
the label of legitimate informality, while reselling water stolen from the formal utility 
through illegal connections would be regarded as illegitimate informality (Hart, 1973). 
Hart (1973) also stresses that his proposed categories of informality refers to activities 
or roles (or practices), and not persons that can be both formal and informal depending 
on what they do.  
 
Defining informality as a practice, rather than as something spatial (something that 
happens in isolated low-income areas) socio-economic (something poor people do) 
regulatory (state sanctioned) or technological (a decentralised practice) enables us to 
see how the state itself engages in informal practices (Kooy, 2014) while also allowing 
us to identify how formal development actually produces informal practices. That said, 
many of the case studies on the informal water sector referenced in this text define the 
informal water sector from a technological and spatial perspective, i.e. they map out 
which methods poor people in the slum use for accessing water, instead of widening 
the scope of the study to include other spaces and definitions of informality.  
 
According to Roy (2011), urban informality has been understood in various ways, 
sometimes as the “habitus of the dispossessed”, a “grassroots rebellion of the poor 
against state bureaucracy” or a “new primary mode of livelihood in a majority of Third 
World cities”. The problems with these understandings of informality from early 21st 
century work is that they all define informality as something synonymous with poverty 
or marginality (Roy, 2011). Misra (2014) also points to other weaknesses with 
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conceptualising water provision systems as either “formal” or “informal”, since 
informality exists also in formal systems and since informal systems needs at least 
some markers of formality to function. From this standpoint, Misra (2014) instead 
argues for abandoning the formal-informal categories for the concept of “emergent 
formalisations”, to better capture the co-existence of both formality and informality in 
all organisations.  
 
However, defining urban informality as practices instead of using it as a label for water 
systems in informal settlements or outside state control, reveals how informality is 
produced, not only in “the slum”, but also in high-income communities and even by 
the state and other elite actors like corporations and the development community (Hart, 
1973; Roy, 2011; Kooy 2014). Liddle’s (2016) research on informal water supply 
systems in Ndola, Zambia, shows that relying on informal water sources is not only 
something the poor do out of necessity. Some of Ndola’s wealthiest citizens prefer 
having their own private boreholes constructed to a cost of approximately 5000 USD, 
instead of relying on the much cheaper formal water supply, that was seen as 
unattractive or unsafe because of its colour, smell and taste (Liddle et al., 2016). 
Similar tendencies can be found in Kooy’s (2014) research on The World Bank’s 
project to expand the piped water network in in Jakarta, Indonesia, in the 1990s. One 
of the failures of the project was the assumption that residents would prefer the piped 
water network over informal supply sources. It turned out that many chose not to 
connect to the expanded network even though they had the possibility to do so. Not 
even all households connected preferred the formal water source, with 15 per cent of 
connected households identified as zero consumers in 2005. These examples show 
why informality cannot be seen simply as backwardness, underdevelopment or a lack 
of modernisation (Kooy, 2014).  
 
Instead, Roy (2011) suggests that urban informality needs to be understood as a 
heuristic device that “uncovers the ever-shifting urban relationship between the legal 
and illegal, legitimate and illegitimate, authorized and unauthorized”. In other words, 
urban informality works as a theoretical tool to show how the slum is produced through 
the practices of the state (Roy, 2011). In the water sector, developing the formal 
networked infrastructure produces informality by sanctioning or targeting certain 
practices as informal, by creating zones of exception where certain actors are 
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encouraged to engage in informal practices and by contestation to rule as subjects resist 
or redefine what is a legal and illegal practice (Kooy, 2014).  
 
Informality as practice 
 
 
By defining urban informality as a practice, we can utilise social practice theory to 
show why some informal water provision systems are regarded as informal while other 
are seen as formal. Practice theory provides a holistic and grounded perspective on 
behaviour change processes and reveals the difficulties of challenging and changing 
practices (Hargreaves, 2011). This study also aims at using practice theory as a 
framework for analysing the state’s or utility’s support for the informal water sector, 
or lack thereof, both by examining how the state reproduces informality through its 
practices and whether the water policies of Kenya and Tanzania are sufficient for 
changing practices in the informal water sector for the better.  
 
Since the social world, according to practice theory, is mainly populated by diverse 
social practices (Reckwitz, 2002), the framework of practice theory invites us to have 
a discussion about the disconnection between “official” and “formal” practices contra 
“informal”, and “community based” practices. Practice theory offers a framework for 
seeing and analysing social phenomena (in this case the informal water sector) as 
something not only driven by structure (like states and organizations) or agency 
(individuals acting “rationally” by deviating from norms to promote their self-
interests), but as a result of individuals carrying forms of interpreting, knowing how 
and wanting and of the usage of things (Reckwitz, 2002). From a practice theory 
perspective, people are seen as practitioners engaged in the practices of everyday life, 
and their reputations, decency, self-respect etc. depend on being recognized as 
competent practitioners (Røpke, 2009). Practices are composed of both equipment 
(sometimes referred to as stuff), images (understood as meanings or symbols) and 
skills (Shove & Pantzar, 2005; Røpke, 2009). Both skills and equipment (including 
both tools and body parts) are naturally necessary to carry out a practice, but images, 
or meaning is equally important to make sense of the activity. Meaning includes both 
ideas of what the activity is good for and what emotions relate to it as well as beliefs 
and understandings. In a case-study of environmentally friendly practices in an office 
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setting, Hargreaves (2011) found that while the skills and material used in practices 
are relatively easy to question, the meanings connected to practices are harder to 
change. In other words, practice theory suggests that people generally use their 
abilities (skills and equipment) to do what makes most sense to them (meaning) as a 
form of reproduction, and without a deeper reflection of what has worked previously 
in a similar situation.  
 
Here, practice theory also opens up explanations to why some households in the 
examples mentioned above (Kooy, 2014; Misra, 2014; Liddle et al., 2014) voluntarily 
choose to rely on informal water systems, even though they are connected to the formal 
supply network, or have the means to connect. The informants in these case studies 
cited the unreliability, perceived bad quality or bad reputation of the formal piped 
water network as the reasons why they chose not to use informal water sources instead. 
Groundwater is, on the other hand, widely taken for granted as a safe water source and 
getting water from the ground has legitimacy among many populations (wells and 
boreholes) especially in areas with high rural-urban migration (Liddle et al., 2014, 
2016). A change in skills and equipment (connecting previously unconnected 
households to the piped network) did not change the behaviour, or practices, of 
households in Ndola or Jakarta since the meaning of using piped water remained 
associated with poor quality and unreliability while the practice of getting water from 
boreholes was connected with better safety, reliability and perhaps also tradition.   
 
Another key feature of practices is that they are only sustained through their repeated 
performance (Shove & Pantzar, 2005; Hargreaves, 2011) which means that changing 
the behaviour of water consumers will always take time, and contrary to popular 
believe, not happen just by connecting more households to the utility’s piped water 
network. However, changing practices is by no means an impossible task. Since 
practices are (re)produced through continual performance by practitioners (Shove & 
Pantzar, 2005), very subtle shifts in the elements of practice (stuff, skills and meaning) 
and how they are experienced by practitioners are central to the broader transformation 
of practices (Hargreaves, 2011). The case-study of environmental practices in an office 
mentioned above showed that while many workers did not accept the meaning of 
recycling and saving energy to reduce the office’s environmental impact, they still 
used their new skills and stuff (paper-bins and turning off equipment when they left 
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the office) but justified the changed practices with new alternative meanings (cost-
saving and being a good rule-following employer, rather than saving the environment) 
(Hargreaves, 2011). Following the same logic, one of the main benefits of the 
delegated management model (DMM) in Kisumu, Kenya, was that it provided new 
meaning to practitioners working together with the formal water utility. Instead of 
“just” offering a supposedly safer and more reliable water source, the DMM had the 
advantage of rewarding communities with job opportunities, more flexible water credit 
and more democratic participation (Schwartz & Sanga, 2010; Butcher, 2016). From a 
practice theory perspective, this change of meaning from accessing water to increasing 
political influence and job opportunities helps explain why communities were satisfied 
with the model.  
 
In the case of the DMM in Kisumu, Kenya, the initiative for experimenting with the 
model came from the state. In other words, the successful change in practice at the 
community level was a result of a change in policy, or practice, at the state level. 
Consumers and producers are both involved in constituting and reproducing practices 
(Shove & Pantzar, 2005) and practice theory can not only be applied to analyse the 
behaviour of individuals and communities, but also the practices of the state. In the 
case of the water sector, this notion also underlines the fact that the state and the utility 
also plays a role in producing informality.  
 
To apply a practice theory perspective on policy making, it is useful to think of the 
formulation of policy as “discursive practises”. Discursive practices, originally a 
concept introduced by Michel Foucault, refers to the practices, or operations, of 
discourses, understood as knowledge formations (Bacchi & Bonham, 2014). This 
means that discursive practices are not only limited to linguistic practices or the use of 
language, but understood as the production of knowledge through a much wider set of 
practices. Building on this definition of discursive practices, Bacchi & Bonham (2014) 
suggest that what needs to be analysed and understood are the discursive practices that 
define what is “the real”, or “what is being done and what is reality made to be”. This 
brings us to Bacchi’s (2009) approach to analysing policy, the ‘What’s the Problem 
Represented to be?’ approach (WPR). The WPR approach seeks out to analyse what 
reality is made to be by questioning the discursive practices that underpin policy 
proposals. More specifically, this is done by questioning what implicit problem a 
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certain policy proposal is supposed to solve, how the representation limits policy 
responses and how the problem could be represented differently. The next section 
describes the approach in greater detail.  
 
To summarise, this study uses the tools of practice theory outlined above by analysing 
the discursive practices, or definitions of reality in policy proposals, through problem 
representations. This approach helps to explain why the state engages in certain 
practices in pursuit of providing safe water to its citizens, or prefer certain water 
policies over others.  
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Research method 
 
This study is based on a critical analysis of water policies in Tanzania and Kenya. To 
evaluate what the water policy proposals in said countries reveal about the attitudes 
towards the informal water sector, I use a poststructuralist approach to analysing 
policy. This is done by applying Bacchi’s (2009) ‘What’s the Problem Represented to 
be?’ approach, or the WPR approach, to analyse policies on urban water provision in 
the water sector development plans and strategies of Tanzania and Kenya. This chapter 
takes a closer look at the strengths and weaknesses of applying the WPR approach to 
analyse policy makers’ attitudes towards the informal water sector. It also provides an 
overview of data collection process and the analysed material. 
 
The ‘WPR’ approach to analysing policy  
 
Using a poststructuralist approach in policy analysis questions the assumptions that 
policy proposals are based on and directs attention to the heterogeneous practices, 
knowledge practices in particular, that produce hierarchal and unequal forms of rule 
(Bacchi & Goodwin, 2016, 4). By focusing on practices, it becomes possible to insist 
that the realities we live in are open to challenge and change (Bacchi & Goodwin, 
2016, 4). The poststructuralist approach to analysing policy challenges the 
conventional view that rules and regulations, or policies, address problems. Instead 
policies are seen as producing ‘problems’, and by critically questioning how these 
‘problems’ are constructed, it’s possible to reveal the underlying assumptions that 
policies are based on and that in turn affects how our lives are imagined and lived 
(Bacchi & Goodwin, 2016, 6).  
 
The analytical tool applied for this study’s analysis is Carol Bacchi’s (2009) approach 
to critical interrogation of public policy: the ‘What’s the Problem Represented to be?’ 
or ‘WPR’ approach. The aim of the WPR approach is to understand policy better than 
policy makers by examining assumptions and conceptual logics in implicit problem 
representations (Bacchi, 2012). The WPR approach has an explicitly normative agenda 
that presumes that some representations of problems benefit the members of some 
groups at the expense of others, and the goal of challenging these representations of 
“the problem” by suggesting it can be represented in an alternative way to avoid some 
of the harming effects (Bacchi, 2009, 44). This approach fits well with the starting 
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point of this study, that the problem with water development in urban SSA represented 
by policy makers as a problem of infrastructure is increasingly being questioned. The 
WPR approach is a flexible research method that can be applied both on specific pieces 
of legislation, policy documents, government reports or censuses. The use of the WPR 
approach in this study is also justified by the fact that the policy documents on water 
development in Tanzania and Kenya rarely explicitly mention the informal water 
sector. The WPR approach allows us to circumvent that problem by revealing attitudes 
on informality through the assumptions behind general water policy proposals.   
 
As mentioned above, the WPR method starts from the premise that policy proposals 
reveal what is thought to be problematic and needs to change, which means that policy 
proposals contain implicit representations of what is considered to be the ‘problem’ 
(Bacchi, 2012a). The ’problem’ represented by policy can be explicit but, as in the 
case of the informal water sector, most of the time government policies do not 
officially declare that there is a problem (Bacchi, 2009). Rather, policy makes changes, 
which implies that there is a problem with the state of things that needs to be changed, 
an implicit problem is therefore a natural part of policy.  
 
For example: if training courses are offered to women as a part of a policy to increase 
their representation in better paid occupations, the ‘problem’, or the thing that is 
‘holding women back’, is represented to be women’s lack of training. Applying the 
WPR approach reveals how this policy proposal rests on some deep-seated 
assumptions about the nature of work and the nature of ‘skill’ while little attention is 
paid to the kinds of work made available, cultural assumptions of ‘women’s work’ or 
other factors barring women entrance to high-paying jobs. It is therefore at least 
possible that policies, with this understanding of the ‘problem’ will change little 
(Bacchi, 2009, 2012a), if anything.  
 
The WPR approach has been widely used to analyse national policies on topics ranging 
from employment, public health, education and drug-use by asking the question: 
What’s the drug-, alcohol-, (un)employment- or education problem represented to be? 
(Lancaster & Ritter, 2014; Bacchi, 2015; Pienaar & Savic, 2016; Salas et al., 2017). 
The WPR approach has proved particularly effective in demonstrating how neoliberal 
discourses represent social and economic problems as problems of the individual, 
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downplaying the role social and economic structures and policy (Clarke, 2017). Even 
though the approach was introduced fairly recently in 2009, Bacchi’s work (2009) has 
been cited over 1500 times in academic journals. The examples listed below were 
among 15 ‘useful illustrations’ of how the WPR approach has been applied up until 
2014, listed by Carol Bacchi herself (The University of Adelaide, 2017).  
 
Lancaster & Ritter (2014) used the WPR approach to study the representation of drugs 
as a policy problem in five Australian National Drug Strategy documents published 
between 1985 and 2011. Their research showed how the ‘drug problem’ in Australian 
policy over time came to be represented primarily as an economically quantifiable 
problem, with policy proposals emphasising the economic cost of drugs to society with 
social harms being portrayed as problematic because of their cost to society, not the 
wellbeing of drug users (Lancaster & Ritter, 2014).  
 
Similarly, in their analysis of Canadian obesity prevention policies, Sales et al. (2017) 
identified five narratives that may be contributing to weight bias and obesity stigma. 
The narratives (e.g. obesity can be prevented through healthy eating and physical 
activity, obesity is an individual behaviour problem) in Canadian public health policies 
create an opportunity for policies to focus mainly on individual-based healthy eating 
and physical activity interventions, which in turn has implications for the 
understanding of obesity (as an individual problem that can be controlled by 
willpower) (Sales et al., 2017).  
 
Application of the WPR approach 
 
The WPR analysis is conducted through a set of six questions and an accompanying 
undertaking to apply the questions to one’s own proposals for change: 
 
1. What’s the ‘problem’ represented to be in a specific policy or policy proposal? 
2. What presuppositions or assumptions underpin this representation of the 
‘problem’? 
3. How has this representation of the ‘problem’ come about? 
4. What is left unproblematic in this problem representation? Where are the 
silences? Can the ‘problem’ be thought about differently?  
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5. What effects are produced by this representation of the ‘problem’? 
6. How/where has this representation of the ‘problem’ been produced, 
disseminated and defended? How has it been (or could it be) questioned, 
disrupted and replaced?    
 
According to Bacchi (2012), the approach should be conceived more as an open-ended 
mode of critical engagement, rather than as a strict formula. For example, in their 
research on Australian drug policy, Lancaster & Ritter (2014) used only the two first 
questions in the WPR approach to answer what the (drug) problem is represented to 
be and what lies behind that representation. Similarly, an analysis of South Africa’s 
National Drug Master Plan (2013–2017) used question 1, 2 and 5 from the WPR 
approach to identify three different proposals in South Africa’s drug policy that inflate 
the “alcohol and drug problem” by reinforcing stigma and marginalisation which in 
turn justifies punitive policy measures (Pienaar & Savic, 2016).  
 
In my analysis of the water development plans of Kenya and Tanzania, I have focused 
on questions 1, 2, 4 and 5 in Bachhi’s approach.  
 
The reason behind this application is simply that the policy documents analysed don’t 
offer data rich enough to answer (3) how a certain representation of a problem has 
come about or similarly (6) how the specific representation has been challenged or 
defended. During the data collection process, I did consider including media coverage 
or parliamentary protocols to shed light on the process of policy making. This would 
have addressed a common critique against using documents as a data source: that 
conflicts in the process of making documents are hidden in the final product 
(Schmelzer, 2016, 19). However, a quick search effort for online news connected to 
the formulation of water policy in both Tanzania and Kenya, paired with searches for 
academic journal articles on media and water policy, suggest that the struggles over 
the water policy formulation process has not been a topic prioritised by news outlets. 
Also, since most of the policy documents analysed are published in the first decade of 
the 21st century, protocols and reliable news coverage of the policy making process 
were difficult to obtain online, and as a result, left out of the study.  
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Since research is as an active component in the shaping of realities, it can also be seen 
as a political practice (Bacchi, 2012a) which means that the WPR approach, naturally, 
also opens up the need for a critical look at the problem represented in this particular 
research project. As outlined in the introduction, the ‘problem’ represented as the 
starting point of this study is that the share of the urban population in SSA without 
access to safely managed water is still relatively large and has in many places 
increased. More specifically to this research effort, the problem represented is that 
governments are not supporting or embracing the informal water sector as a 
sustainable alternative to the failing urban infrastructural ideal of a piped water 
network that provides safe water for everyone.  
 
One could criticise my representation of the problem for being biased towards 
community-based water solutions, since I have chosen not to focus in detail on other 
possible aspects of how to make the lacking water provision in urban SSA work. This 
criticism would be justified, since the whole project started from my interest in 
alternative water solutions. Another approach to studying the urban water utilities in 
SSA might as well be to look at corruption, poverty (underfinancing) or environmental 
aspects (such as the impact of droughts and climate change on the water production 
capacity).  
 
On the other hand, in defence of the construction of the ‘problem’ in this study, it is 
one that has surfaced from several case studies into the informal water sector in urban 
SSA (Kjellén, 2006; Allen et al., 2006; Chakava et al., 2014; Kooy, 2014; Liddle et 
al., 2016; Mapunda et al., 2018) and one that policy makers in the region don’t seem 
to have acknowledged. However, I do welcome a critical WPR analysis into what the 
‘problem’ that this study builds upon is represented to be.    
 
Data collection 
 
The data analysed consists of four policy documents outlining the future development 
of the water sectors in Kenya and Tanzania. The analysed documents can be divided 
into two categories: water sector development plans and water sector development 
strategies, with one document from each category selected for Kenya and Tanzania 
(Table 4).  
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The water sector development plans (Tanzania’s Water Sector Development 
Programme 2006-2025 and Kenya’s National Water Master Plan 2030) are 
characterized by detailed and technical plans for the water sector including, for 
example, maps of water basin systems and extensive cost- and financial calculations 
with few analytical chapters. Both the WSDP and the executive summary of the 
NWMP are over 200 pages long. In addition to the executive summary of the Kenyan 
NWMP, parts of the documents sectoral report C on water supply (152 pages) was 
included.  
 
Tanzania’s water sector development plan (WSDP) has five components: (1) The 
Water Resource Management Component, (2) The Rural Water Supply and Sanitation 
Component, (3) The Urban Water Supply and Sewerage Component, (4) 
Strengthening of the Ministry of Water and (5) Strengthening of the Executive 
Agencies. Most of the policies and problematisations analysed in this study were 
included in the first three components.  
 
Kenya’s water sector development plan (NWMP) on the other hand, is divided by the 
country’s six geographical catchment areas, each with its own (1) Water allocation 
policy, (2) Water Supply Development Plan, (3) Sanitation Development Plan, (4) 
Irrigation Development Plan, (5) Hydropower Development Plan, (6) Water 
Resources Management and Development Plan (7) Flood and Drought Disaster 
Management Plan and (8) Environmental Management Plan. Most of the policies and 
problematisations analysed in this study were included in the Water Supply 
Development Plan. It is also worth noting that Kenya’s National Water Master Plan 
2030 has been formulated with technical assistance from the Japan International 
Cooperation Agency (JICA) that also played a similar role in the formulation of the 
previous NWMP in 1992. JICAs involvement is most visible in the document as the 
credited source in tables mapping out both the current and future need for water 
production proposals and targets for water production, sources target areas etc.   
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Table 4 Data collected for analysis 
Policy document Publisher Year Pages  
The National Water Master 
Plan 2030 (executive summary 
& sectoral report C) (NWMP) 
Ministry of Environment 
(Kenya) 
 
2013 219, 
152 
The National Water Services 
Strategy (NWSS) 
Ministry of Water and 
Irrigation (Kenya) 
2007 38 
Water Sector Development 
Programme 2006-2025 (WSDP) 
Ministry of Water 
(Tanzania) 
2006 213 
National Water Sector 
Development Strategy (NWSDS) 
Ministry of Water and 
Irrigation (Tanzania) 
2008 109 
 
Compared to the development plans mentioned above, the water sector strategies 
(Kenya’s National Water Services Strategy and Tanzania’s National Water Sector 
Development Strategy) are briefer and offer a more nuanced discussion about the 
strategies, challenges, goals and reasoning behind water policies, while leaving out 
technical details about specific project and implementations of said policies.  
 
The Kenyan strategy is 38 pages long and the Tanzanian 109 pages. The Kenyan 
strategy offers brief descriptions of goals of water sector development as well as 
challenges facing the country’s water sector, followed by strategic policy responses 
articulated in brief bullet-points. Each specific topic is given 1–3 pages in the strategy. 
In contrast to Kenya’s water sector development plan, the strategy offers deeper 
justifications, arguments and background for the policies presented in both documents.  
 
The Tanzanian strategy follows a similar structure, even though it is a bit more 
detailed. In Tanzania’s strategy, each topic is contextualised with a brief background, 
a problem statement, policy direction, goal and finally a strategy expressed in bullet-
points. Much like in Kenya’s strategy, each topic is given 1–3 pages, but the chapters 
are provided with a more detailed introduction.  
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The documents analysed can be criticized for being outdated. However, these 
documents do represent the current water development plans and strategies setting the 
frames for goals and policies to be achieved in 2025 or 2030. No medium-term 
development plans were included since they are of an even more technical nature and 
also build upon the foundation of the documents included in this analysis. All 
documents were obtained from government websites in April 2019.  
 
Limitations 
 
If the study relies heavily or solely on documents, like this one does, it is generally 
better to have access to a wide array of documents providing a strong set of evidence 
(Bowen, 2009). To build a stronger foundation for my analysis and avoid biases caused 
by one-sided policy documents, I have chosen to include both the most specific policy 
documents to be found of the development of the water sector (the water sector 
development plans) and documents providing arguments and nuanced descriptions of 
the policy directions chosen (the water sector development strategies) 
 
The main upside of building a research project that relies on these kinds of policy 
documents is that the method is efficient and far less time consuming than other 
methods like conducting interviews or building a statistical study. Policy documents 
are also ‘unobtrusive’ and ‘non-reactive’, i.e. they are unaffected by the research 
process (Bowen, 2009) which means both that they are stable and exact research 
subjects and that the research project benefits from not having to deal with many of 
the ethical problems with intervention connected to face-to-face research, especially 
in the context of development studies. For one, using documents as a primary data 
source does not distort the effects of a researcher’s presence in the field, that can affect 
the behaviour of informants (Bowen, 2009).  
 
However, relying on policy documents as a primary data source is also associated with 
challenges. First, documents are produced for some purpose other than research and 
usually do not provide sufficient detail to answer a research question on their own 
(Bowen, 2009). In this study, this is not a big issue since the research questions focus 
specifically on the implications of written-down policy proposals. However, the fact 
that policy documents are not standardised and I use data from two different countries 
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makes the situation in Tanzania and Kenya difficult to compare. The fact that both the 
water policy programmes comes with different timelines also makes comparison 
between the two countries challenging.  
 
Documentation is sometimes not accessible, or access is made difficult. The policy 
documents analysed in this study were retrieved from online sources in April 2019 and 
may suffer from some biased selectivity, i.e. the available documents are likely to be 
aligned with corporate policies and procedures (Bowen, 2009) and the most revealing 
documents are perhaps not possible to find on government webpages. However, in this 
particular case, biased selectivity can also work in favour of the research project, since 
it can reveal the emphasis of a particular organisation and, maybe more importantly, 
what is not emphasised. I would argue that biased selectivity is at least partially 
circumvented here by incorporating documents from different government ministries 
published with different motives (plans and strategies). Also, the WPR approach 
outlined above should not be affected in any meaningful way by biased selectivity. On 
the contrary, this bias might in fact amplify what the ‘problem’ is represented to be in 
the policy proposals on urban water development. 
 
A third criticism is that documents can hide disagreements, conflicts of interests or the 
influences of different actors in the process of making the documents (Schmelzer, 
2016, 19). Here, also relying on documents from other organizations and actors 
involved in the process of policy formulation (such as national archives, newspapers, 
or NGOs) can help to expose possible conflicts in the process of making the 
documents. In the case of national water policies, the use of media accounts as a 
supplement in addition to policy documents is also justified by the fact that media also 
plays a part in shaping the views of informal institutions (Bob-Milliar & Obeng-
Odoom, 2011). However, as mentioned earlier, media accounts of the policy making 
process are excluded from the study due to a lack of coverage and difficulties in 
obtaining both online and printed media accounts.  
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Results  
 
The analysis is based on four main representations of problems related to urban water 
supply and urban informality. These representations were identified and selected based 
on their relevance to the informal water sector as well as on how frequently they were 
mentioned in the data. The most dominating represented problem in the policy 
documents was that low access to safe water is a problem of lacking investment in 
infrastructure in urban areas. This representation contradicts some of the other 
representations of problems identified, for example the problem of low-income urban 
areas not using appropriate water supply technologies.  
 
The analysis shows an inconsistency in how both Tanzanian and Kenyan water policy 
approaches the informal water sector in urban and rural contexts. While the role of the 
urban informal water sector is largely neglected in favour of a heavy reliance on large-
scale infrastructure projects, the rural informal practices are supported through 
community-based water management policies affecting tens of millions of people. 
This inconsistency suggests that policy makers apply different standards to urban and 
rural informality, with the consequence of urban unserved populations being left with 
the only option of waiting for the successful expansion of the formal piped network.  
 
The high reliance on heavy investment in infrastructure to solve water shortages in 
urban settings is far from reassuring for the millions of people that so far have been 
failed by the promise of the urban infrastructural ideal (Kooy, 2014). On the other 
hand, the policies on rural water supply does show an increased awareness of the 
weaknesses of the piped network as a one-size-fits-all solution. This at least opens up 
the possibility for policy makers to apply the rural approach to unserved urban 
communities, i.e. support community-based informal practices.  
 
To answer the main research question, how the problem of urban water supply is 
constructed in Kenyan and Tanzanian water policy, the results show that the problem 
is mainly constructed as a lack of investment in infrastructure and poorly maintained 
water systems. There are however some nuances and variations in how the problem is 
represented, with some attention given to the problems of uninvolved stakeholders, a 
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lacking knowledge of appropriate water supply technologies in low-income areas and 
informality being represented as problematic. 
 
To answer the second research question, how Tanzanian and Kenyan water policies 
approach the informal water sector, the results show a high-reliance on investment in 
formal large-scale infrastructure projects, which implies a neglect of the informal 
water sector. On the other hand, the analysed documents do address informality mainly 
from a technical standpoint in expressing the will to explore “alternative” technologies 
in urban areas and community-based water management in rural areas. In other words, 
the results show a high reliance on updating and expanding the piped water network 
as the one-size-fits-all model of urban water development in Kenya and Tanzania, 
while still leaving the door open for acknowledgement and support to the informal 
water sector, especially in low-income urban areas and rural areas.  
 
The following sections provide further detail into the process of selecting policy 
proposals and analysing the represented problems found in the data.  
 
Analysed policy proposals 
 
Four major policy themes relating urban water supply and informality were selected 
for the analysis (Table 5). The identification of the general policy themes was done by 
reading through the introductions, summaries, stated policy goals and strategic policy 
measures included in all analysed documents, combined with a review of the table of 
contents and a search for keywords like informal, informality, unregistered, vendors, 
technology etc. The analysed policy proposals were selected using the following 
criteria: if they specifically addressed urban informal water systems, if they addressed 
informality in rural settings and if the policies were mentioned frequently as the main 
policy proposals for increasing urban water access.  
 
The policy proposals selected for the analysis are: (1) Investment in large-scale 
infrastructure projects, (2) Identifying and promoting alternative water supply 
technologies (3) Supporting community-based water management in rural areas, and 
(4) Formalisation of informal water providers.  
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Table 5 Selected policy proposal and policy document 
Policy proposal 
  
Policy document 
1) Investment in large-scale infrastructure 
projects to develop, refurbish and expand 
urban water supply systems.   
 
Water sector development plan of 
Tanzania (WSDP),  
Water sector development plan of 
Kenya (NWMP) 
Water sector development strategy 
of Tanzania (NWSDS),  
Water sector development strategy 
of Kenya (NWSS) 
2) Identifying and promoting alternative water 
supply technologies.  
 
The proposal is specifically aimed urban low-
income groups and cost-effective 
technologies. The proposal also includes 
involve consumers and communities in the 
planning and selection process.  
 
Water sector development strategy 
of Tanzania (NWSDS),  
Water sector development strategy 
of Kenya (NWSS) 
 
3) Establishment and support of community-
based water supply management models in 
rural areas. 
 
Water sector development plan of 
Tanzania (WSDP),  
Water sector development plan of 
Kenya (NWMP) 
4) Formalisation of informal water providers.  
 
This is primarily done by tying them to formal 
Water Service providers to guarantee water 
quality control and use of approved tariffs.  
Water sector development strategy 
of Kenya (NWSS) 
 
 
The process of identifying policy proposals quickly revealed a heavy focus on 
investments in infrastructure projects as the main policy proposal addressing water 
access in urban areas. The need for new infrastructure, or lack of sufficient 
infrastructure, was mentioned in all analysed documents (Table 5). In the water 
development strategies, insufficient infrastructure was mentioned as one of the main 
challenges associated with urban water supply in either the background or introduction 
sections of the documents. Investment in infrastructure was even more frequently 
mentioned as the main solution to urban water access in the water sector development 
plans. The Kenyan water sector development plan NWMP proposed a “large-scale 
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urban water supply system development to cope with rapid growth of the urban 
population” for all of the urban centres (NWMP, 2013, EX-32, EX-49, EX-68, EX-
87, EX-105) while Tanzania’s water development plan WSDP listed inadequate 
investment in infrastructure as the main challenge for the development of the water 
sector (WSDP, 2006, 1-4) and the rehabilitation, expansion and construction of new 
water infrastructure as the first prioritized areas of intervention (WSDP, 2006, 4-10). 
The proposal clearly fulfils the criteria of being frequently mentioned and represented 
as the main policy, and was therefore selected as the first proposal to be analysed.  
 
Informality in the urban water sector was only addressed in detail in the water sector 
development strategies of Kenya and Tanzania, and relatively briefly in sections 
ranging from about six to ten pages (NWSS, 2007, 10–12, 16–18; NWSDS, 2008, 50–
56). That said, these sections were detailed enough to be included as policy proposals 
(Table 5, proposals 2 and 4) in the analysis, fulfilling the criteria of explicitly 
addressing the urban informal water sector.   
 
All documents did however address the rural informal water sector in greater detail, in 
calling for down-up community-managed solutions with a flexible mix of water 
system technologies. The more specific water sector development plans of both Kenya 
and Tanzania even incorporate the rural informal water sector as a key policy 
component. The Kenyan development plan NWMP (2013) proposes the policy of 
small-scale rural waters supply systems for all of Kenya’s rural population that is not 
covered by a piped water network, estimated at approximately 17 million people in 
2030 (NWMP, 2013). The Tanzanian development plan (WSDP, 2006) proposes that 
all rural water supply and sanitation services should be managed on a community-
level, covering 50 million people by 2025 (WSDP, 2006, 1-10). The frequent mentions 
and reliance on community-based solutions in rural areas, in combination with its 
relevance for informality in that the policy includes a support of informal practices and 
actors, is the reason why support of community-based water management in rural areas 
was selected as the third policy proposal to be analysed (Table 5).  
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What’s the problem represented to be?  
 
By following the WPR approach and working backwards from the policy proposals to 
identify the implicit representations of the problem the policies are intended to solve, 
four general problematisations, or representations of the water problem in urban and 
informal settings, were identified (Table 6).  
 
The representations of problems identified in the data are: (1) Low access to safe water 
in urban areas is a technical problem of lacking investment in infrastructure, (2) Rural 
and poor areas are not using the appropriate water supply technologies, (3) 
Communities are not committed to sustaining their water supply systems and (4) 
Informality is in itself a problem of the water sector. Note that policy proposals 2 and 
3 share two different representations of problems (Table 6).  
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Table 6 Representation of the problem (WPR), policy proposals and policy documents 
Representation of the water 
problem (what’s the problem 
represented to be?) 
Policy proposal Policy document 
1) Low access to safe water in 
urban areas is a technical 
problem of lacking investment in 
infrastructure and poorly 
maintained water supply 
systems.   
1) Investment in large-scale 
infrastructure projects to develop, 
refurbish and expand urban 
water supply systems.   
 
NWSDS (Tanzania),  
WSDP (Tanzania), 
NWMP (Kenya),  
NWSS (Kenya) 
 
2) The appropriate water supply 
technologies are not identified, 
leading to a high reliance on 
advanced capital-intensive 
solutions in areas where it’s not 
cost-effective.  
 
Large-scale waters supply 
systems are not suitable for small 
rural communities, where a mix 
of different water supply 
technologies are required. 
 
2) Establishment and support of 
community-based water supply 
management models in rural 
areas. 
 
3) Identifying and promoting 
alternative water supply 
technologies by involving low-
income urban communities. 
NWSDS (Tanzania),  
WSDP (Tanzania), 
NWMP (Kenya),  
NWSS (Kenya) 
 
 
3) Communities are not 
committing to sustaining their 
water facilities if they are not 
involved in the selection, 
operation and maintenance 
process. 
2) Establishment and support of 
community-based water supply 
management models in rural 
areas. 
 
3) Identifying and promoting 
alternative water supply 
technologies by involving low-
income urban communities. 
 
NWSDS (Tanzania),  
WSDP (Tanzania), 
NWMP (Kenya),  
NWSS (Kenya) 
 
4) The informal water sector is 
operating in an unprofessional 
manner outside basic standards 
and regulations leading to a lack 
of water quality control with 
implied health risks and loss of 
revenue. 
4) Formalisation of informal water 
providers.  
 
This is primarily done by tying 
them to formal Water Service 
providers to guarantee water 
quality control and use of 
approved tariffs. 
NWSS (Kenya) 
 
 
The problem representations implicit in the policy proposals show several interesting 
contradictions. In the policy documents, both Kenya and Tanzania introduce proposals 
with contradicting representations of the problem, representations of informality and 
proposals on how to “fix” the problem.  
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First, Kenya’s water sector development strategy (NWSS, 2007) expresses hostility 
against informality in general (Table 6), which in the policy proposal is defined as 
water providers operating outside state control or regulation, calling for informal 
actors to be “formalised” by signing a contract with the formal service providers. This 
narrow conception of informality and how to “formalise” informal actors has not been 
successful in the past (Steiler, 2018) and is, on the contrary, a way in which the state 
itself produces informality (Roy, 2011). On the other hand, both Kenya’s and 
Tanzania’s water development strategies (NWSDS, 2008; NWSS, 2007) express a will 
to explore “appropriate water supply technologies” for low-income areas, arguing that 
capital-intensive solutions don’t always work for increasing access in low income 
areas. This second problematisation (Table 6) relating to urban informality in the water 
sector is contradicting the proposal to formalise the informal sector (Table 6, policy 
4), by implying a criticism against the “urban infrastructural ideal” (Kooy, 2014) and 
a need to include low-income urban communities in the planning and development of 
their water supply systems.  
 
Another interesting conflict in the represented problem of water access is the one 
between rural and urban areas. While the problem of lacking access to water in urban 
areas is generally seen as a technical infrastructure problem that can be solved with 
aggressive investment in modern solutions, the problem of poor access to water in 
rural areas is represented as the same modern solutions not being appropriate in rural 
settings. These differing representations expose a view of rural areas as traditional and 
backwards, in need of more flexible and local solutions while the centralised piped 
water network is seen as a fitting solution for all urban, modern, areas.  
 
The representations of the problem as the appropriate technologies not being identified 
and the lack of infrastructure are also in conflict with one another. While the water 
sector development strategies of both Kenya and Tanzania (NWSS, 2007; NWSDS, 
2008) suggest that alternative cost-effective technologies need to be identified and 
promoted, especially in unserved low-income urban areas the more technically 
oriented water sector development plans (WSDP, 2006; NWMP, 2013) put forward 
large-scale infrastructure problems as the main solution for urban water supply, 
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representing the problem, not as a lack of alternative solutions, but as a lack of 
investment in piped water systems.  
 
The following sections elaborate on the represented problems behind the policy 
proposals identified in the data by applying questions 2, 4 and 5 in the WPR approach 
(Bacchi, 2009) to each represented problem. Some further attention is also given to the 
internal contradictions between the representations, mentioned above.  
 
The problem of lacking infrastructure 
 
Of all the policies put forward to increase water access in urban areas in Kenya and 
Tanzania, the proposal to increase investment in large-scale infrastructure projects to 
refurbish and expand the existing infrastructure as well as plan and develop new 
infrastructure is dominating in all analysed documents. For example, Kenya’s water 
development plan (NWMP, 2013) that divides the country into six catchment areas, 
puts forward heavy investment in infrastructure as the main policy to increase urban 
water access for five of these six catchment areas:  
 
It is therefore required to implement a large-scale urban water supply 
system development to cope with rapid growth of the urban population 
and achieve the target coverage ratio of 100%. (NWMP, 2013, EX-32, 
EX-49, EX-68, EX-87, EX-105) 
 
Tanzania’s water sector development plan (WSDP, 2006) offers a similar prioritisation 
of policy interventions. The plan lists 10 priority areas, nine of which directly involve 
increased investment in infrastructure and represent lacking infrastructure as the 
problem:  
 
In order to achieve the Water Sector Development Programme 
objectives, resource allocation and expenditure during programme 
implementation will focus on the following priority areas: 
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(i) rehabilitation of malfunctioning water supply systems including 
pumping facilities, treatments plants, distribution mains and networks in 
both rural and urban areas; 
(ii) expansions of existing water supply systems in both rural and urban 
areas; 
(iii) construction of new water supplies schemes to bring services to 
areas not covered by existing water supply systems in both rural and 
urban areas including periurban areas; 
(iv) development, extension and upgrading of urban sewerage facilities; 
(v) rehabilitation and expansion of hydrological, hydro geological and 
hydro meteorological networks; 
(vi) exploration of underground water in the thrust of finding new water 
sources, especially in dry areas to ease drilling of boreholes; 
(vii) catchment restoration and conservation of water sources from 
pollution and close monitoring of water quality; 
(viii) promotion and construction of rainwater harvesting incorporating 
small, medium and strategic large-scale dams and reservoirs; 
(ix) promotion of improved latrine facilities in rural areas as well as 
awareness creation on hygiene; and 
(x) capacity building, training and strengthening of BWOs, LGAs, 
UWSAs, executive agencies, and at national level to carry out their 
mandated responsibilities. (WSDP, 2006, 4-10) 
 
 
The problem represented within these policy proposals is that there is a lack of 
functioning water service infrastructure in urban areas. In other words, low access to 
safe water in urban areas is represented as a technical problem of lacking investment 
in infrastructure and poorly maintained water supply systems. This representation is 
implicit in the policy proposal of more and better infrastructure, but the lack of 
adequate infrastructure is also explicitly stated as one of the main challenges for urban 
water supply in both Kenya’s water sector development strategy (NWSS, 2007) and 
Tanzania’s water sector development plan (WSDP, 2006), even though other reasons 
for poor water access also are given:  
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Sustainable access to safe water and basic sanitation is still declining in 
terms of quality and quantity. The main reasons are old infrastructure, 
inadequate management and maintenance of existing infrastructure, 
insufficient sustainability, investments not enough concentrating on the 
options of fast tracking access and informal service provision operating 
outside a framework of basic standards and regulation. (NWSS, 2007, 
2) 
 
Water insecurity is compounded by (a) inadequate investments in 
constructed water storage and other water resources infrastructure to 
buffer against the impact of droughts and floods (climate variability) and 
inadequate investments in water quality management and pollution 
control; (b) investments in costly but unreliable infrastructure, and (c) 
inadequate investments in water resources management systems, 
institutions, and regulations... (WSDP, 2006, 1-4) 
 
The representation of the main problem with urban water access being insufficient 
infrastructure has big implications. Both Kenya, Tanzania and the UNs sustainable 
development goals have stated the objective to provide safe water for all by 2030, or 
in the case of Tanzania, by 2025. For Tanzania, this means that between 2006 and 
2025, 13,6 million urban dwellers will have received improved services (WSDP, 2006, 
1–11). In Kenya, the urban water supply will have to cover an urban population of 
44,3 million in 2030 (NWMP, 2013, MA-49).  
 
However, these enormous development plans, and the representation that a lacking 
infrastructure is the problem, is built upon the assumption that heavy investment in 
infrastructure will in fact increase safe access to water (question two in the WPR 
approach, Bacchi, 2009). This assumption is contested by earlier research on the water 
sector in SSA, showing how the piped water network has struggled to achieve financial 
sustainability, both under public and private service providers (Kjellén, 2006; Kooy, 
2014; Liddle et al., 2016; Allen et al. 2017; Adams & Smiley, 2018). One example is 
the piped network in Dar es Salaam, that in spite of increasing capacity, has failed to 
keep pace with urbanisation (Smiley, 2018).  
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According to Kjellén (2006), the reasons why investment in the piped water network 
has failed to increase access to safe water is its lack of financial sustainability due to 
leaks, unregistered customers and poor management. These issues are also addressed 
in both Kenyan and Tanzanian water policy. In addition to water supply and resource 
development, Kenya’s water sector development plan (NWMP, 2013) also includes 
management plans and a plan for institutional strengthening (NWMP, 2013, EX-13) 
which includes capacity strengthening at the community level. Tanzania’s water sector 
development plan (WSDP, 2006) comes with a similar water resource management 
component (WSDP, 2006, 4-10) as well as with a plan to commercialise all urban 
water supply agencies by making them financially autonomous and responsible for 
investments and meeting their own operations and maintenance costs. This is argued 
to strengthen their incentives to be financially sustainable.  
 
Ultimately all authorities will need to become commercial organisations 
with increasing responsibility for meeting their own operation and 
maintenance costs and capital investments. This will require raising 
tariffs while getting a better understanding of the willingness and ability 
to pay and assisting the poor through differential charging, introducing 
modern billing systems, full ownership of assets, better management of 
customer debt, and capital investment through grants and loans. 
(WSDP, 2006, 1-11) 
 
In addition to institutional capacity strengthening and commercialization, the analysed 
water policies also propose different tactics to minimize non-revenue water (NRW), 
that in Kenya is estimated at a ratio 45 per cent of all produced water (NWMP, 2013, 
EX-15). Especially the Kenyan water sector development plan stresses the need to 
install water meters for all households and old pipes in urban areas to minimize the 
NRW-ratio to 20 per cent in all catchment areas (NWMP, 2013, EX-32, EX-49, EX-
69, EX-88, EX-106, EX-123). While the assumption that simply investing in, updating 
and expanding urban water infrastructure will increase access historically has not 
proved true in SSA, the water policies of Kenya and Tanzania do address capacity 
building and careful planning as a component of the infrastructure development plans. 
From this limited set of data, it is however impossible to assess whether the 
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infrastructure proposals analysed differ from previous attempts to solve the water 
problem by heavy investment in infrastructure.   
 
To address the fourth question in the WPR approach, what is left unproblematic or 
silent in this representation of the problem (Bacchi, 2009), I would argue that the role 
of the informal water sector in delivering water to millions of urban residents is the 
biggest blind spot. The representation of the problem with urban water supply being a 
lack of investment in infrastructure ignores the everyday practices of obtaining water 
by all those not currently not connected to the centralised water system. This neglect 
of the informal water sector is precisely what scholars like Kooy (2014), Liddle (2016) 
and Smiley (2018) have argued is one of the main barriers to increasing safe water 
access, especially in low-income urban areas.  
 
As to what effect this representation of the problem produces (WPR question five), the 
representation of the problem being underinvestment in infrastructure will certainly 
produce the demand for more investment in urban water infrastructure. This narrative 
also seems to be more powerful in the analysed water policies than ideas about 
exploring alternative technologies, elaborated on in the next section. While the 
proposal to support appropriate and cost-effective technologies, especially in low-
income urban areas was put forward in the water sector development strategies 
(NWSS, 2007: NWSDS, 2008), the more technical and detailed long-term water 
development plans (WSDP, 2006; NWMP, 2013) pay little attention to alternative 
technologies in urban settings, and instead focus on solving the problem represented 
as a lack of functioning infrastructure in cities. The representation of the problem as a 
lack of infrastructure commits the same sin as the second identified problem (the lack 
of appropriate technologies in low-income areas) in assuming that informality is 
something that will fade away when the superior piped network is expanded, even 
though informality exist on all levels of society (Roy, 2011) and there have been 
instances when also high-income communities with the option of being connected 
have resorted to more trustworthy informal solutions (Kooy, 2014; Liddle et al., 2016). 
The pursuit of the urban infrastructural ideal (Kooy, 2014) stands in direct conflict 
with the proposals to explore “alternative” urban water technologies in the water sector 
development strategies and is clearly the dominating narrative in both Kenyan and 
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Tanzanian water policy together with institutional strengthening and community-
based rural water management.  
 
The problem of finding the right technology  
 
The representation of the problem as a problem of finding the right technology was 
found in all analysed policy documents. In the policy proposals identified for the 
purpose of this study (Table 5), the representation of a lack of appropriate technologies 
as a problem was implicit in both proposal 2 (to promote alternative cost-effective 
technologies where the piped network has failed) and 3 (to establish community-based 
water systems in rural areas with technologies best suited for the community’s needs).  
 
Policy proposal 2, was identified in Tanzania’s and Kenya’s water sector development 
strategies (NWSS, 2007; NWSDS, 2008). While the represented problem of lacking 
infrastructure, analysed above, works as a justification for pursuing further investment 
in large-scale infrastructure projects as the go-to solution for increasing access to safe 
water in urban areas, the implied problem with finding the right technology, is much 
more nuanced with a built-in critique against relying solely on the expansion of the 
piped water network. Especially, the Tanzanian development strategy articulates this 
critique in several sections:  
 
There has been a historical failure to provide water supply and 
sanitation services to low income groups and people living in peri-urban 
areas, thereby denying them social equity considerations, and the right 
to water for life and survival. (NWSDS, 2008, 51) 
 
Furthermore, the cost-benefits of alternative technologies to increase 
coverage have not been given due consideration. Peri-urban and rural 
areas have been neglected in favour of larger urban centres. (NWSDS, 
2008, 56) 
 
Here, the criticism of the urban infrastructural ideal (Kooy, 2014) is quite explicit. The 
problem represented in the quotes above and in the proposal to promote alternative 
cost-effective technologies, is that the appropriate water supply technologies are not 
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identified. This in turn has led to a high reliance on advanced capital-intensive 
solutions in areas where it’s not cost-effective. The proposal also includes identifying 
the low-income groups in need of alternative technologies:  
 
Low-income groups will be identified and provided with appropriate 
water supply and sanitation services. However, these groups will be 
expected to contribute to the cost of the provision of these services in line 
with their ability to pay. (NWSDS, 2008, 51) 
 
Here, the Tanzanian water sector development strategy’s proposal that low-income 
groups are “expected to pay” for their water implies that the problem of finding the 
right technology is in fact a problem of achieving financial sustainability in low-
income areas. In other words, the problem is represented as a lack of cost-effective 
technologies where the cost of investment, maintenance and operations does not 
exceed the revenue from users. This connection between financial sustainability and 
technology is also implicit in Kenya’s water sector development strategy (NWSS, 
2007) that blames both donor funds and the formal water service providers for the lack 
of suitable technologies in places where the piped network is not financially 
sustainable:  
 
Donor funds concentrate more on improving services to already 
connected consumers by upgrading existing systems, and not enough on 
providing services to the urban poor through low cost technologies, 
which could offer fast tracking of access in the urban setting. Low cost 
technology already in place does not respond to minimum requirements 
and is therefore often not sustainable. In addition, formal WSP do not 
yet have enough knowledge to install and operate sustainable 
commercial viable low-cost systems such as kiosks. (NWSS, 2007, 17) 
 
Here, the water sector development strategy of Kenya acknowledges that there are low 
cost technologies in place, but that these technologies do not respond to minimum 
requirements, supposedly requirements of quality, price and formality. The quote also 
stresses the need for formal water service providers to learn how to operate 
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commercially viable low-cost systems, emphasizing the representation of the problem 
as a lack of cost-effective technologies.   
 
The underlying assumptions in this representation of the problem (question two in the 
WPR approach), is that supporting alternative technologies in areas neglected in 
favour of urban centres where the piped network actually works, would increase both 
access to safe water and revenue. This assumption is in line with evidence from studies 
on the delegated management model that, despite some challenges, has managed to 
increase both economic opportunities, involvement and access to safe water in low-
income urban areas (Schwartz & Sanga, 2010; Butcher, 2016). 
 
What is left unproblematic or silent in the representation of the problem (question four 
in the WPR approach) is the definition of safe access to water. While the representation 
of the problem here goes much further than in the first proposal to formalise the 
informal water providers, it still relies on defining access to safe water in relation to 
the piped network, hence the term “alternative” technologies. Kenya’s water sector 
development strategy (NWSS, 2007) interestingly, limits the scope of “alternatives” 
to not include ground water sources, which in practice means that the water used has 
to come from the formal utility, and that “alternative technologies” refers to supply 
technologies like tanker trucks or water kiosks:  
 
Protection of water sources on the surface does not solve the problem of 
contaminated ground water and therefore the use of such inappropriate 
water sources by informal providers shall be discouraged. (NWSS, 
2007, 17) 
 
In other words, what is left unproblematic is the assumed superiority of the urban 
infrastructural ideal. The represented problem implies another, deeper, problem, i.e. 
the inability for low-income communities to sustain the advanced, scalable and 
(normally) cost-effective large-scale water supply system. An alternative 
representation of the problem could be that not enough support is given to existing 
community-based water supply solutions. This would open up more concrete policy 
proposals like supporting and developing the informal water sector, instead of just 
“identifying cost-effective alternative technologies” in relation to the piped network, 
 60 
which leads us to question number five in the WPR approach (What effects are 
produced by this representation of the problem?) (Bacchi, 2009).  
 
Representing the problem as a lack of identified, alternative cost-effective water 
supply technologies results in a proposal to explore alternative technologies. This is a 
step in the right direction, from the perspective of the case-studies recommending state 
support to the informal water sector mentioned above (see Kjellén, 2006; Allen et al., 
2006; Chakava et al., 2014; Kooy, 2014; Liddle et al., 2016; Mapunda et al., 2018). 
However, the problem represented in this policy still regards the urban infrastructural 
ideal as the most attractive model, regarding everything else as “alternatives” or 
exceptions to the rule. This can potentially prove challenging in higher income 
communities that are covered by the piped water network but still prefer relying on the 
possibly more trusted informal, ground water based, systems (Kooy, 2014; Liddle et 
al., 2016).  
 
Rural and urban informality 
 
Interestingly, in policies concerning rural water supply, the effects of the represented 
problem changes and result in completely different policy proposals. When looking at 
the more specific and technical policies laid out in Kenya’s and Tanzania’s water 
sector development plans (WSDP, 2006; NWMP, 2013), the proposal to identify and 
promote cost-effective alternative solutions in unserved low-income urban areas is 
dismissed. However, the represented problem of finding the right technology still 
persists in the policy proposal to establish and support community-based water supply 
systems in rural areas. In Kenyan and Tanzanian rural water policy, local solutions are 
no longer presented as “alternative technologies”, but as the foundation of the rural 
water supply. Kenya’s water development plan (NWMP, 2013) proposes the policy of 
small-scale rural waters supply systems for approximately 17 million rural Kenyans in 
2030. The policy in Tanzania goes even further, proposing that all rural water supply 
and sanitation services should be managed on a community-level, covering 50 million 
people by 2025 (WSDP, 2006, 1-10), with a technology mix that resembles todays’ 
water practice:  
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Conditions in Tanzania’s districts vary widely, from semi-desert to rain 
forest. The technologies used for acquiring water supply are 
correspondingly varied. (…) The technology mix includes hand-dug 
wells equipped with hand pumps, boreholes and hand pumps, gravity-
fed piped systems, electric- or diesel-driven pumped and piped systems, 
charco dams, protected springs, and windmills. The proportion of each 
of these technologies in use depends on the climate, topography and the 
type of water source. (WSDP, 4-26–27)  
 
The different approaches to using a wide mix of water supply technologies in urban 
and rural areas, suggests that policy makers apply different standards to the rural and 
urban population when it comes to water supply. When anything else than the piped 
water network is described as “alternative” technologies in urban settings, these 
systems are the norm in rural water policy, or even described as traditional as in 
Kenya’s water sector development strategy:  
 
Domestic water sources in the rural setting include small-scale piped 
systems, water points with hand pumps (wells, boreholes) and traditional 
sources such as streams, dams, shallow wells and springs. These 
traditional sources are very susceptible to pollution because they are 
open or not protected. (…) In addition, communities are often not 
sufficiently trained in running the installations, including management 
aspects, such as bookkeeping and also register a high turnover of 
committee members. Water quality at the source is generally not 
monitored, thus subjecting the users to water of unknown quality. There 
is not enough awareness and appreciation of the importance of good 
hygiene in most rural areas. (NWSS, 2007, 19) 
 
This representation of rural water management as problematic because of “traditional” 
sources and unprofessional managers helps explain the different approaches to rural 
and urban water policy, where rural communities are described as traditional and unfit 
for modern technological solutions and urban communities are left with the policy 
proposal of “identifying alternative technologies” in anticipation of the expansion of 
the piped water network. Interestingly, framing rural communities as traditional, can 
 62 
actually work in their benefit, since both Kenyan and Tanzanian water policy supports 
local, flexible water provision arrangements that, in light of earlier research, for 
example on the community-based delegated management model (Schwartz & Sanga, 
2010; Butcher, 2016), should have a higher chance of succeeding in providing the 
community with safe water. This brings us to the third problem, that is also implicit in 
the policy proposals to explore community-based water management: the problem of 
uninvolved and uncommitted water users. 
 
The problem of uninvolved water users 
 
The problem of appropriate technologies analysed above was identified in two 
different policy proposals, to identify appropriate technologies in low-income urban 
areas and to support community-based solutions in rural areas (see Table 5). Implicit 
in these two policy proposals is also the representation of uninvolved communities as 
the problem. In other words, the problem is represented to be that communities are not 
committing to sustaining their water facilities if they are not involved in the selection 
of technology as well as the operation and maintenance processes. This representation 
of the problem is not only implicit, but frequently and explicitly articulated in all the 
analysed documents, especially in sections that justify the reliance on community-
based water management systems in rural areas. One of the clearest examples is found 
in Tanzania’s water sector development plan:  
 
For a long time, the government has been the owner and operator of 
rural water supply systems. This has led to a lack of commitment by 
communities to sustain their facilities. It has also led to overlap of roles 
and inadequate coordination. The existing water supply systems are 
unable to meet water demands. This has led to the prevalence of water 
borne diseases and loss of productive time that is used to search for, 
collect and transport water. (…) The process of bottom up planning 
needs strengthening. (WSDP, 2006, 1-4)  
 
The bottom-up planning is suggested in the water sector development plan to concern 
up to 50 million Tanzanians in 2050, since the water management model laid out in 
the WSDP rest on a community-based management model for the country’s whole 
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rural population. The model proposes that Community-Owned Water Supply 
Organisations (COWSOs) responsible for the planning, management operation and 
maintenance of the water services are established in villages. The model is described 
as quite flexible and the COWOSOs can take many different legal forms, like Water 
Users Associations (WUA) or community-owned companies, depending on the 
technical option chosen and the number of communities served (for example if it is a 
single borehole or a local piped system serving more than one villages). Kenya’s water 
sector development plan (NWMP, 2013) also sets out water resource management as 
one of the water policy’s core pillars. With stakeholder involvement as the first 
specific policy objective:  
 
All water resources are managed, regulated and conserved in an 
effective and efficient manner by involving the stakeholders, 
guaranteeing sustained access to water and equitable allocation of water 
while ensuring environmental sustainability. (NWMP, 2013, EX-13) 
 
In both Kenya’s and Tanzania’s policies, the assumptions underpinning the 
representation of lacking community involvement in water system management as a 
problem is that increased involvement would strengthen the commitments to sustain 
the communities’ water facilities, resulting in better run and autonomous operations. 
This assumption also has some support in evidence from studies on community-based 
water management models in East Africa. Water management models based on co-
production between the state and communities has not only strengthened communities’ 
participation in the formulation of water policy, but also paved the way for economic 
opportunities for women in establishing water-related businesses within the 
community (Butcher, 2016; Adams & Smiley, 2018). However, community-based 
water management can easily be undermined if the state uses the arrangement just to 
withdraw from its responsibility of water supply to the community or to take control 
over the informal sector rather than to strengthen the capacity of the community 
(Ahlers et al., 2013). Community-based arrangements often suffer from too little state 
involvement and support, leaving communities on their own after the initial investment 
in small-scale infrastructure (Dill, 2010; Allen, 2017; Adams et al., 2018). Studies on 
the delegated management model has shown that it still needs increased commitment 
of the state to support the capacity of communities managing their own water systems 
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to make the model sustainable (Schwartz & Sanga, 2010; Butcher, 2016). The 
assumption underpinning the represented problem in this case, that increased 
involvement leads to stronger commitment to upholding water services, seem to be 
right. But if the policy truly seeks out to build a sustainable community-based water 
supply model, it cannot be taken further to assume that communities can manage water 
services by themselves, completely without state support.  
 
Regarding the fifth question in the WPR approach (what effects are produced by this 
representation of the problem?), the repercussions of representing a lack of community 
involvement and participation are potentially enormous in both Kenya and Tanzania, 
but especially in Tanzania where the whole rural water supply system is envisioned to 
rest on a community-based management model. It is easy to imagine a wide range of 
positive outcomes from involving communities in planning, development and 
management of water systems, but there is always the risk of communities being left 
on their own without sufficient state support, in which case the ambitious bottom-up 
approach mainly works as a justification for the state to neglect difficult communities 
where the formal utility cannot sustain a cost-effective water system. On a more 
theoretical level though, the effects produced by representing a lack of community 
involvement as the problem are that water policies are approached from the water users 
point of view, which is totally in line with the call for states to acknowledge and 
support the informal water sector in pursuit of providing safe water for all (Ahlers et 
al., 2014; Kooy, 2014; Liddle et al., 2016; Mapunda et al., 2018).  
 
The problem of informality  
 
The National Water Services Strategy (NWSS, 2007) of Kenya is the analysed 
document that most explicitly addresses the informal water sector. The 38 pages long 
document mentions informal service providers as a problem several times, including 
in the introduction (NWSS, 2007, 2) and in a sub-section dedicated to water supply in 
poor urban areas (NWSS, 2007, 16–18). The main policy targets and responses relating 
to the informal water sector is to “formalise” it, by linking informal providers to the 
formal WSPs (Water Service Providers) and forcing informal providers to comply with 
regulation. The represented problem in this policy proposal is that the informal water 
sector is a problem precisely because of its informal nature, which in turn is argued to 
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lead to a lack of water quality control. This representation of the problem is explicitly 
articulated in the description of challenges relating to water supply in the settlements 
of the urban poor (NWSS, 2007, 16):  
 
Recent studies carried out in the settlements of the urban poor indicate 
that about 80% of the poor in Kenya do not have sustainable access to 
affordable safe drinking water. The reason is that service provision to 
the poor is mostly left to the informal service providers not operating 
under regulation and according to standards. In addition, the ground 
water sources in urban settlements are highly contaminated and 
protected wells and boreholes in these areas can no longer be regarded 
as safe and used for service provision. (NWSS, 2007, 17) 
 
Here, the Kenyan water sector development strategy, explicitly connects low access 
to safe water among low-income groups to the lack of regulations and standards in 
the informal water sector.  
 
To address the second question in the WPR approach (What presuppositions or 
assumptions underpin this representation of the ‘problem’?) (Bacchi, 2009), this 
representation of the problem assumes that simply “formalising” informal providers 
will (a) make them follow rules and regulations on water quality and (b) increase 
access to water in low-income areas. The first assumption, that formalisation and 
regulation will lead to a higher quality of services, is debatable, since this tactic to 
formalise has failed in earlier attempts, for example in Maputo, Mozambique, when it 
was used only to gain more state control over the informal water sector, without any 
clear benefit for the water users (Ahlers et al., 2013).  
 
The second assumption about increased access as a consequence of formalisation is 
even more far-fetched. The assumption that having informal providers “going formal” 
by complying with regulation and oversight will increase water access is paradoxical 
since the reason that informality has prevailed in low-income areas in the first place, 
to a large extent, is the failure of the formal water supply system to provide these areas 
with safe water (se for example Chakava et al., 2014; Kooy, 2014; Liddle et al., 2016; 
Mapunda et al., 2018). To connect increased access with formality is misleading, but 
from policy makers’ point of view it has the benefit providing a justification for the 
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favoured solution to increasing access, i.e. heavy investment in the piped network 
system (Table 5, policy 4). This justification is also strengthened by the representation 
of ground water sources in urban settlements as unsafe, on which I elaborate more in 
the following section.  
 
Connecting the lack of safe water access in low-income areas to informality also shifts 
the responsibility, or even the blame, for the failure of water service provision to the 
informal sector and away from the formal water provider. The question of 
responsibility for a lack of access to safe water is the main issue that is left silent or 
unproblematic in the representation of the problem of informality. A different way to 
think about the “problem” of informality could be to leave out the question of access 
to water and instead focus on the lack of water quality control and, perhaps, 
coordination of water services. This would likely lead, not to a total dismissal of 
informality and a justification for the urban infrastructural ideal (Kooy, 2014), but 
towards a more constructive approach where informal actors are supported by the state. 
Interestingly, this comes closer to the representation of the problem of finding the right 
technology, analysed above.  
 
Finally, to address what effects are produced by the representation of informality as 
the problem (question five in the WPR approach), I would argue that this is a strikingly 
clear example of how the state itself produces informality. To make this argument, 
informality in the water sector needs to be understood, not only as a label for water 
systems in poor communities outside state control, but as practices produced by all 
communities, for example rich neighbourhoods relying on their own boreholes 
(Liddle, 2016), and even the state (Kooy, 2014). When policy makers suggest that the 
problem with water access in low-income areas is informality itself, they neglect the 
informal practices that occurs in all income-groups and on all levels of society. By 
doing this, the state creates zones of exceptions, where a certain kind of informality is 
accepted (informal systems in high-income areas) and another is problematized 
(informal systems in low-income areas) (Kooy, 2014). In this way, the state produces 
informality specifically in low income areas, (Roy, 2011) and connects it to a lack of 
water access and poor quality of water. One could argue that by representing 
informality as the problem of low water access in low-income areas, the state produces 
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both informality and a justification to pursuit its favoured policy responses, i.e. the 
urban infrastructural ideal.  
 
Discussion 
 
The idea that state support of the informal water sector is needed to provide safe water 
for all urban residents in sub-Saharan Africa was the starting argument of this thesis. 
Previous research has shown little or no evidence of this kind of support, although 
there have been some positive outcomes of community-public partnerships in SSA 
(Schwartz & Sanga, 2010; Butcher, 2016). By analysing water policies in Kenya and 
Tanzania I wanted to find out how these states approach informality, and if there are 
signs of incorporating informal community and household practices in the formal 
development plans or if the situation is as grim as portrayed in some of the case studies 
cited in the introduction, that the state totally neglects informal service providers.  
 
So, what’s the takeaway from my results? First and foremost, they are in line with 
previous research (for example by Kjellén, 2006; Allen et al., 2006; Chakava et al., 
2014; Kooy, 2014; Liddle et al., 2016; Mapunda et al., 2018) in identifying a heavy 
reliance on the one-size-fits-all model of the urban infrastructural ideal, to reach every 
urban citizen by a piped water connection, in both Kenya and Tanzania. However, 
there are signs of careful acknowledgement of informal practices. 
 
The WPR approach to analysing policy proved useful in looking beyond the policy 
proposals, and asking what the implicit problem with water supply in urban areas is 
represented to be. This approach yielded a more optimistic result than just looking at 
the policy proposals would have done, by showing how policy makers in both Kenya 
and Tanzania do see the “right” problems to truly acknowledge and support the 
informal water sector, like acknowledging the need for alternative solutions and 
stakeholder involvement. However, the go-to recipe of large-scale infrastructure as 
solution for pretty much every urban water supply problem is still the dominating 
solution.  
 
Interestingly, the support for informal water systems is especially clear in rural 
settings, where a big proportion of the policy in both countries relies completely on 
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the establishment and support of community-based “alternative” water supply 
systems, but the policy strategies also stresses the need for stakeholder involvement 
and “appropriate” technologies in low-income urban areas. These policies, I would 
argue, give a more nuanced picture of the state’s approach to informality than the one 
that is usually portrayed in studies on the informal water sector, were the state is 
viewed as an indifferent actor that has completely given up on providing informal 
settlements with safe water. In this aspect, my analysis provides nuance to authors like 
Kjellén (2006), Kooy (2014) and Smiley (2016) whose studies on certain urban areas 
in SSA show little or no state support and involvement in improving water services. 
On the other hand, there are also studies showing successful community-based water 
management schemes (Schwartz & Sanga, 2010; Butcher, 2016), often working 
together with the state or NGOs to provide safe water according to the needs and means 
of the community.  
 
Water urban supply is a complex topic that, depending on the policy maker’s approach, 
can result in a wide range of conclusions about which policy measures are most 
suitable and effective in increasing access to safe water. The big question for the future 
of informal water sector and water access in low-income urban areas seem to be how 
much weight and attention the state is willing to give to representations of the problem 
that results in support of the informal sector. If the main problem in water policy on a 
national, or even global, level is represented to be access to water, which is the case 
in all documents analysed in this thesis, policies will assume that some proportion of 
the population lacks access to water completely, which of course isn’t the case since 
access to water is a condition for sustained life. If the main problem, on the other hand 
is represented as, for example, a water management issue, the general policy might 
take completely different directions. In both the water sector development plans 
(NWMP, 2013; WSDP, 2006) water management is at the core of the policy, giving 
room to stakeholder involvement and community-based management, but the most 
clearly defined policy measures are still based on the general representation of the 
problem as low access to water.  
 
Going back to the call for states to acknowledge and support the informal water sector, 
the biggest reassurance in my results are the state’s approach to rural water supply 
systems which shows a willingness to support both a mix of “alternative technologies”, 
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in urban settings often understood as informal practices, and a bottom-up approach to 
water management. These are precisely the types of policies the usual suspects of 
scholars cited in this thesis (Kjellén, 2006; Allen et al., 2006; Chakava et al., 2014; 
Kooy, 2014; Liddle et al., 2016; Mapunda et al., 2018) have called for states to 
introduce also in urban and peri-urban settlements. The reassuring bit is that, even 
though the state apparently is not as willing to introduce these measures in urban 
settings where the piped network, according to the urban infrastructural ideal, should 
reach everyone, both Kenya and Tanzania now have these measures in their policy 
tool-box. If the heavy investment in urban infrastructure fails again, as previous 
research suggests it probably will, then the step to take the rural approach to urban 
settlements isolated from formal water services might not be too big.  
 
In hindsight, looking at the water policy of only one of the two countries included 
could perhaps have yielded more clearer results. Focusing entirely on Tanzania would 
have opened the door to narrowing down the study to only include water policies in 
Dar es Salaam which possibly would have given more clear indications on the formal 
utility’s attitude towards the informal water sector. Similarly, focusing only on Kenya 
would have allowed a narrower policy analysis on the delegated management model, 
applied in Kisumu (Schwartz & Sanga, 2010). During the analytical process, it also 
became clearer to me that international donor agencies, specifically the World Bank, 
have played a significant role in constructing the narrative of formalising the informal 
sector. An alternative approach to the same research problem laid out in this thesis 
would have been to focus on the discourse on informality among international donors, 
this approach would likely have yielded sturdier results better applicable to other 
situations.  
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Conclusions 
 
This thesis set out to analyse how the Kenyan and Tanzanian state approach the 
informal water sector in their water development plans, programmes and strategies 
leading up to 2025 and 2030. This approach was informed by previous research papers, 
mainly case studies, on the informal water sector in sub-Saharan Africa that often 
arrived at the same conclusion or recommendation: That the state should do more to 
acknowledge and support informal practices as viable alternatives to the failed project 
of providing safe water to all urban residents by the formally managed piped water 
network (Kjellén, 2006; Allen et al., 2006; Chakava et al., 2014; Kooy, 2014; Liddle 
et al., 2016; Mapunda et al., 2018).  
 
Tanzania and Kenya were chosen as subject countries in this attempt because of their 
plans to reform their water sectors to face the challenge of urbanisation and population 
growth with policy goals set to the end of the coming decade, and because of the rich 
research on the informal water sector in each country. To approach this research 
problem, an applied version of Carol Bacchi’s (2009) poststructuralist approach to 
analysing policy was used. The WPR approach (What’s The Problem Represented To 
Be) proved useful in examining the represented problems underpinning policy 
proposals for the water sector in each country. By first identifying key policy proposals 
relating to the informal water sector, and urban water supply systems in general, and 
then working backwards to identify the implicit representations of the problem the 
policies sought out to solve, I identified four main problem-narratives that drive policy 
making in relation to the urban informal water sector.  
 
A closer analysis of these narratives exposed an interesting contradiction in both the 
formulated problems underpinning policies and in the policies, themselves. On one 
hand, Kenyan and Tanzanian water policies represents the problem of urban water 
supply as a lack of investment in infrastructure and poorly maintained water systems, 
resulting in policy proposals to invest heavily in large-scale water system 
infrastructure. On the other hand, competing representations of the problem as a lack 
of stakeholder involvement and cost-effective solutions for low-income urban 
settlements was also identified, resulting in proposals to support communities in 
managing their own water supplies.  
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One of the most interesting findings my analysis was the different approaches to rural 
and urban informality present in both Kenyan and Tanzanian water policies. The 
development plans mainly proposed heavy investment in large-scale infrastructure as 
the go-to solution for improving access to safely managed water in urban areas, almost 
completely neglecting urban informal practices, apart from brief mentions in the water 
sector development strategies. Regarding rural informality, on the other hand, the 
policies expressed a completely different approach by acknowledging the need for 
communities to take control of their own water management and technologies while 
the state’s role would be one of a supporting actor.  
 
The national water policies of Kenya and Tanzania still do not fully acknowledge, let 
alone, support the urban informal water sector. The move to more down-up solutions 
for rural water supply systems, however, act as a reassuring sign of how the 
representations of the problem as the piped network not being a one-size-fits-all model 
has gained some ground in the national water policies. If the problematisation of the 
urban infrastructural ideal has led to a more flexible and case-based approach in rural 
settings, it is not unthinkable that the same representation of the problem will be 
applied to urban settings in the future, paving the ground for promoting similar 
community-based solutions on a larger scale in unserved urban areas that lack access 
to safely managed water.  
 
This conclusion, that Kenya and Tanzania in the future have the option of looking to 
their rural water supply policies to solve a lack of safe urban water access, opens up 
for some other interesting research-projects on the informal water sector. Future 
research on the topic could focus on the implementation of community based water 
management in rural Kenya and Tanzania, the implementation of similar community 
based models in urban settings as well as differences between community based water 
management in rural and urban areas. These kinds of research attempts could give 
clearer answers to the possibility of applying the rural water policies analysed in this 
thesis in an urban context, specifically in places the piped water network does not 
reach.  
 
The supportive stance towards informality in rural water systems also opens up for 
interesting opportunities for the Finnish development cooperation in SSA. Finnish 
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development aid is heavily focused on education and capacity building, which could 
include looking into community capacity building in the water sector by supporting 
and researching community based water management models in both rural and urban 
areas. This would potentially benefit the development of sustainable water solutions 
in SSA. Here, the development community could also benefit from Finland’s own 
experience of the use of water cooperatives as a management model to bring water to 
remote areas, unserved by municipal water schemes, like the Finnish archipelago.  
 
Finally, I would like to return to the question in the title of this thesis: Informal urban 
water systems – sustainable development or a temporary problem? The results in my 
study suggests that informal urban water systems are still to a large extent seen as a 
temporary problem that will fade away as soon as the grand vision of the urban 
infrastructural ideal is realized. However, both Kenyan and Tanzanian water policy 
has opened the door to supporting informal practices as sustainable solutions, as a way 
to achieve the ambitious goal of safe water for all, stated both in the countries’ national 
development visions and in the UNs Sustainable Development Goals for 2030.  
  
 73 
References 
 
Adams, E. A., & Boateng, G. O. (2018). Are urban informal communities capable of 
co-production? The influence of community–public partnerships on water access in 
Lilongwe, Malawi. Environment and Urbanization, 30(2), 461-480. 
 
Adams, E. A., & Smiley, S. L. (2018). Urban-rural water access inequalities in 
Malawi: Implications for monitoring the sustainable development goals. Natural 
Resources Forum, 42(4), 217-226.  
 
Adams, E. A., Sambu, D., & Smiley, S. L. (2018). Urban water supply in Sub-
Saharan Africa: historical and emerging policies and institutional arrangements. 
International Journal of Water Resources Development, 1-24. 
 
Ahlers, R., Cleaver, F., Rusca, M., & Schwartz, K. (2014). Informal space in the 
urban waterscape: Disaggregation and co-production of water services. Water 
Alternatives, 7(1), 1-14. 
 
Ahlers, R., Perez Güida, V., Rusca, M., & Schwartz, K. (2013). Unleashing 
entrepreneurs or controlling unruly providers? The formalisation of small-scale water 
providers in Greater Maputo, Mozambique. The Journal of Development Studies, 
49(4), 470-482. 
 
Allen, A., Hofmann, P., Mukherjee, J., & Walnycki, A. (2017). Water trajectories 
through non-networked infrastructure: insights from peri-urban Dar es Salaam, 
Cochabamba and Kolkata. Urban Research & Practice, 10(1), 22-42. 
 
Allen, A., Dávila, J. D., & Hofmann, P. (2006). The peri-urban water poor: citizens 
or consumers?. Environment and Urbanization, 18(2), 333-351. 
 
Bacchi, C. L. (2009). Analysing policy: What's the problem represented to 
be? Frenchs Forest, N.S.W.: Pearson. 
 
Bacchi, C. (2012). Introducing the “What’s the Problem Represented to be?” 
Approach. Engaging with Carol Bacchi: Strategic interventions and exchanges, 21-
24. 
 
Bacchi, C., & Bonham, J. (2014). Reclaiming discursive practices as an analytic 
focus: Political implications. Foucault studies, (17), 179-192. 
 
Bacchi, C. L. & Goodwin, S. (2016). Poststructural policy analysis: A guide to 
practice. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. 
 
Bacchi, C. (2017). What’s the problem represented to be? Examples of Application. 
The University of Adelaide. Viewed 3 May 2019. 
<https://www.adelaide.edu.au/carst/docs/wpr/wpr-examples-of-application.pdf> 
 
Bayliss, K., & Tukai, R. (2011). Services and supply chains: The role of the domestic 
private sector in water service delivery in Tanzania. 
 
 74 
Bakker, K. (2003). Archipelagos and networks: urbanization and water privatization 
in the South. Geographical Journal, 169(4), 328-341. 
 
Bakker, K. (2007). The “commons” versus the “commodity”: Alter‐globalization, 
anti‐privatization and the human right to water in the global south. Antipode, 39(3), 
430-455. 
 
Bob-Milliar, G. M., & Obeng-Odoom, F. (2011). The informal economy is an 
employer, a nuisance, and a goldmine: multiple representations of and responses to 
informality in Accra, Ghana. Urban Anthropology and Studies of Cultural Systems 
and World Economic Development, 263-284. 
 
Bowen, G. A. (2009). Document analysis as a qualitative research 
method. Qualitative research journal, 9(2), 27-40. 
 
Butcher, S. (2016). The “Everyday water practices” of the urban poor in Kisumu, 
Kenya. Urban solutions: Metropolitan approaches, innovation in urban water and 
sanitation, and inclusive smart cities, 5-22. 
 
Central Intelligence Agency. (2016). CIA World Factbook. [viewed 28 January 
2019]. Available from: https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/ 
 
Chakava, Y., Franceys, R., & Parker, A. (2014). Private boreholes for Nairobi's 
urban poor: The stop-gap or the solution?. Habitat International, 43, 108-116. 
 
Clarke, A. (2017). Analyzing problematization as a situated practice in critical policy 
studies: a case study of ‘customer focus’ policy in urban compliance 
services. Critical Policy Studies, 1-21. 
 
Crow, B., & Odaba, E. (2010). Access to water in a Nairobi slum: women's work and 
institutional learning. Water International, 35(6), 733-747. 
 
Dar, O. A., & Khan, M. S. (2011). Millennium development goals and the water 
target: details, definitions and debate. Tropical Medicine & International Health, 
16(5), 540-544. 
 
Dill, B. (2010). Public–public partnerships in Urban water provision: The case of 
Dar es Salaam. Journal of International Development, 22(5), 611-624. 
 
Dos Santos, S., Adams, E.A., Neville, G., Wada, Y., de Sherbinin, A., Mullin 
Bernhardt, E. & Adamo, S.B. (2017). Urban growth and water access in sub-Saharan 
Africa: Progress, challenges, and emerging research directions, Science of The Total 
Environment, vol. 607-608, pp. 497-508. 
 
Emenike, C. P., Tenebe, I. T., Omole, D. O., Ngene, B. U., Oniemayin, B. I., 
Maxwell, O., & Onoka, B. I. (2017). Accessing safe drinking water in sub-Saharan 
Africa: Issues and challenges in South–West Nigeria. Sustainable cities and 
society, 30, 263-272. 
 
 75 
Fund for Peace. (2018). Fragile States Index. [viewed 28 January 2019]. Available 
from: http://fundforpeace.org/fsi/ 
 
Galiani, S., Gertler, P., & Schargrodsky, E. (2005). Water for life: The impact of the 
privatization of water services on child mortality. Journal of political 
economy, 113(1), 83-120. 
 
Hargreaves, T. (2011). Practice-ing behaviour change: Applying social practice 
theory to pro-environmental behaviour change. Journal of consumer culture, 11(1), 
79-99. 
 
Hart, K. (1973). Informal income opportunities and urban employment in 
Ghana. The journal of modern African studies, 11(1), 61-89. 
 
Hopewell, M. R. (2014). Trends in access to water supply and sanitation in 31 major 
sub-Saharan African cities: An analysis of DHS data from 2000 to 2012. BMC public 
health, 14(1), pp. 208. 
 
Ifejika Speranza, C., Kiteme, B., Wiesmann, U., & Jörin, J. (2018). Community-
based water development projects, their effectiveness, and options for improvement: 
lessons from Laikipia, Kenya. African geographical review, 37(3), 192-208. 
 
Joshi, A. (2004). Institutionalised Co-production: Unorthodox Public Service 
Delivery in Challenging Environments. Journal of Development Studies, 40(4), pp. 
31-49. 
 
Kjellén, M. (2006). From public pipes to private hands: Water access and 
distribution in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania (Doctoral dissertation, Acta Universitatis 
Stockholmiensis). 
 
Kooy, M. (2014). Developing Informality: The Production of Jakartaʼs Urban 
Waterscape. Water Alternatives, 7(1), pp. 35-53. 
 
Lall, Somik Vinay; Henderson, J. Vernon; Venables, Anthony J. (2017). Africa's 
Cities: Opening Doors to the World [online]. Washington, DC: World Bank. [viewed 
23 january 2019]. Available from: 
https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/handle/10986/25896  
 
Lancaster, K., & Ritter, A. (2014). Examining the construction and representation of 
drugs as a policy problem in Australia's National Drug Strategy documents 1985–
2010. International Journal of Drug Policy, 25(1), 81-87. 
 
Liddle, E.S. & Fenner, R. (2017). Water point failure in sub-Saharan Africa: the 
value of a systems thinking approach. Waterlines. 36(2) pp. 140-166. 
 
Liddle, E.S., Mager, S.M. and Nel, E.L. (2016). The importance of community-based 
informal water supply systems in the developing world and the need for formal 
sector support. The Geographical Journal, 182(1), pp. 85-96. 
 
 76 
Liddle, E.S., Mager, S.M. and Nel, E.L. (2015). The suitability of shallow hand dug 
wells for safe water provision in sub-Saharan Africa: Lessons from Ndola, 
Zambia. Applied Geography, 57, pp. 80-90. 
 
Liddle, E. S., Mager, S. M., & Nel, E. (2014). Water quality awareness and barriers 
to safe water provisioning in informal communities: A case study from Ndola, 
Zambia. Bulletin of Geography. Socio-economic Series, 26(26), 167-181. 
 
Mapunda, D. W., Chen, S. S., & Yu, C. (2018). The role of informal small-scale 
water supply system in resolving drinking water shortages in peri-urban Dar Es 
Salaam, Tanzania. Applied geography, 92, 112-122. 
 
McGranahan, G., Njiru, C., Albu, M., Smith, M. D., & Mitlin, D. (2006). How small 
water enterprises can contribute to the Millennium Development Goals: Evidence 
from Dar es Salaam, Nairobi, Khartoum and Accra. 
 
Misra, K. (2014). From Formal-Informal to Emergent Formalisation: Fluidities in the 
Production of Urban Waterscapes. Water Alternatives, 7(1). 
 
Nganyanyuka, K., Martinez, J., Wesselink, A., Lungo, J. H., & Georgiadou, Y. 
(2014). Accessing water services in Dar es Salaam: Are we counting what counts?. 
Habitat International, 44, 358-366. 
 
Nickson, A., & Vargas, C. (2002). The limitations of water regulation: The failure of 
the Cochabamba concession in Bolivia. Bulletin of Latin American Research, 21(1), 
99-120. 
 
Nilsson, D., & Nyanchaga, E. N. (2008). Pipes and politics: a century of change and 
continuity in Kenyan urban water supply. The Journal of Modern African 
Studies, 46(1), 133-158. 
 
Nyangena, K. O. (2008). Privatization of water and sanitation services in Kenya: 
Challenges and prospects. Africa Development, 33(4). 
 
Obeng-Odoom, F. (2012). Beyond access to water. Development in Practice, 22(8), 
1135-1146. 
 
Olajuyigbe, A. (2012). Water vending in Nigeria - A case study of Festac Town, 
Lagos, Nigeria. Mediterranean Journal of Social Sciences, 3(1), pp. 229-239. 
 
Overbo, A., Williams, A. R., Evans, B., Hunter, P. R., & Bartram, J. (2016). On-plot 
drinking water supplies and health: A systematic review. International Journal of 
Hygiene and Environmental Health, 219(4-5), 317-330. 
 
Paul, S. (1992). Accountability in public services: exit, voice and control. World 
Development, 20(7), 1047-1060. 
 
Pickering, A. J., & Davis, J. (2012). Freshwater availability and water fetching 
distance affect child health in sub-Saharan Africa. Environmental science & 
technology, 46(4), 2391-2397. 
 77 
 
Pienaar, K., & Savic, M. (2016). Producing alcohol and other drugs as a policy 
‘problem’: A critical analysis of South Africa's ‘National Drug Master Plan’(2013–
2017). International Journal of Drug Policy, 30, 35-42. 
 
Reckwitz, A. (2002) ‘Toward a Theory of Social Practices: A Development in 
Culturalist Theorizing’, European Journal of Social Theory, 5(2), pp. 243–263.  
 
Republic of Kenya. Ministry of Environment, Water and Natural Resources. Water 
Resources management. (2013) The National Water Master Plan 2030.  
 
Republic of Kenya. Ministry of Water and Irrigation. (2007) The National Water 
Services Strategy.  
 
Ritchie, J., & Spencer, L. (2002). Qualitative data analysis for applied policy 
research. The qualitative researcher’s companion, 573(2002), 305-29. 
 
Roy, A. (2011). Slumdog Cities: Rethinking Subaltern Urbanism. International 
Journal of Urban and Regional Research, 35(2), pp. 223. 
 
Rugemalila, R., & Gibbs, L. (2015). Urban water governance failure and local 
strategies for overcoming water shortages in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania. Environment 
and Planning C: Government and Policy, 33(2), 412-427. 
 
Rweyemamu, A. (2018, 9 Sep). New spirit as new DAWASA is launched. IPP 
Media/Guardian on Sunday Retrieved 
from https://www.ippmedia.com/en/news/new-spirit-new-dawasa-launched 
 
Røpke, I. (2009). Theories of practice — New inspiration for ecological economic 
studies on consumption. Ecological Economics, 68(10), pp. 2490-2497. 
 
Salas, X. R., Forhan, M., Caulfield, T., Sharma, A. M., & Raine, K. (2017). A critical 
analysis of obesity prevention policies and strategies. Canadian Journal of Public 
Health, 108(5-6), e598-e608. 
 
Sambu, D. K., & Tarhule, A. (2013). Progress of water service providers in meeting 
millennium development goals in Kenya. African Geographical Review, 32(2), 105-
124. 
 
Schmelzer, M. (2016). The hegemony of growth: the OECD and the making of the 
economic growth paradigm. Cambridge University Press. 
 
Schwartz, K., & Sanga, A. (2010). Partnerships between utilities and small-scale 
providers: delegated management in Kisumu, Kenya. Physics and Chemistry of the 
Earth, Parts A/B/C, 35(13-14), 765-771. 
 
Shove, E., & Pantzar, M. (2005). Consumers, producers and practices: 
Understanding the invention and reinvention of Nordic walking. Journal of 
consumer culture, 5(1), 43-64. 
 
 78 
Silvestri, G., Wittmayer, J., Schipper, K., Kulabako, R., Oduro-Kwarteng, S., 
Nyenje, P., ... & van Raak, R. (2018). Transition Management for Improving the 
Sustainability of WASH Services in Informal Settlements in Sub-Saharan Africa—
An Exploration. Sustainability, 10(11), 4052. 
 
Smiley, S. L. (2013). Complexities of water access in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania. 
Applied Geography, 41, pp. 132-138. 
 
Smiley, S. L. (2018). Explaining improvements and continuing challenges in water 
access in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania. International Journal of Water Resources 
Development, 1-18. 
 
Steiler, I. (2018). What’s in a Word? The Conceptual Politics of ‘Informal’ Street 
Trade in Dar es Salaam. Articulo-Journal of Urban Research, (17-18). 
 
United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division. 
(2017). World Population Prospects: The 2017 Revision, Key Findings and Advance 
Tables.  
 
United Republic of Tanzania. Ministry of Water. (2006). Water Sector Development 
Programme 2006-2025.  
 
United Republic of Tanzania. Ministry of Water and Irrigation. (2008). National Water 
Sector Development Strategy.  
 
UNDP (2018). Human Development Indices and Indicators: 2018 Statistical Update. 
New York: United Nations Development Programme.  
 
WHO/UNICEF (2018). Progress on Drinking Water, Sanitation and Hygiene: 2017 
Update and SDG Baselines. Geneva: World Health Organization (WHO) and the 
United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF).  
